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I. INTRODUCTION
Both investors and Congress have expressed concern about the fairness
of securities industry-sponsored and administered arbitral forums.1 It is
important to the legitimacy of any nonjudicial forum that it be perceived by
the participants as fair to all parties. 2 If fairness is a concern, the arbitral
forum's existence as a viable alternative dispute resolution mechanism will
be undermined.
Disputes between investors and the securities industry generally are
resolved through arbitration. 3 In order to open a securities brokerage
account, investors usually are required to sign an agreement requiring them
to resolve all disputes through arbitration. 4 This same agreement generally
requires that arbitration proceedings between investors and members of the
I See ARBrrRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, NATIONAL Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS,
INC., SECURrIEs ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK
FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOvERNORS 93 (1996) [hereinafter ARBITRATION POLICY
TASK FORCE]; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECuRTEs ARBITRATION: How
INVESTORS FARE: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 4 (1992); Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Ass'n, Petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission 4-5, 10
(Oct. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter PIABA].
2 See 1.1 NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., ARBITRATOR TRAINING:
PANEL MEMBER COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE vii (1996); THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL
1 (1996); Constantine N. Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 279, 308 (1984).
3 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 478 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223
(1987); see also ARBrrRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 6; GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 4; Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First
Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 486 (1996).
4 See David A. Lipton, Mandatory Securities Industry Arbitration: The Problem
and the Solution, 48 MD. L. REv. 881, 885 (1989); see also ARBrrRATION POLICY TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 6.
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securities industry must be conducted in an arbitral forum sponsored,
controlled, and administered by the securities industry, 5 rather than an
independent arbitral forum such as the American Arbitration Association
(AAA). 6 Most of the securities arbitration proceedings between investors
and members of the securities industry are conducted in the arbitral forum
sponsored and administered by the only registered securities industry
association in the United States, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD). 7 In 1997, 5,997 arbitration cases were filed with the
NASD.8
According to Mary Schapiro, President of NASD Regulation, Inc.
(NASDR), the NASD arbitral forum is "committed... to serve as... a
process that is fair to all parties. "9 One of the hallmarks of a fair arbitral
forum is the ability of both parties to equally participate in the selection of
5 See Lipton, supra note 4, at 884; see also ARBrrRATON POLICY TASK FORCE,
supra note 1, at 6.
6 The AAA is a
public service, not-for-profit organization dedicated to helping manage conflict
through a variety of dispute resolution techniques .... It provides a forum for the
hearing of disputes, tested rules and procedures that have broad acceptance, case
administration services, and a roster of high caliber, impartial experts to hear and
resolve cases.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, ELEMENTS OF CHANGE: ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1995).
7 See ARBrrRATION PoLIcY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 7. The NASD is
registered pursuant to section 15A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994). It is a self-regulatory organization (SRO) and is funded
exclusively by its membership, which includes virtually every broker or dealer in the
United States that conducts a securities business vith the public. See NATIONAL Ass'N
OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., NASD MANUAL 151 (1999). The NASD has delegated its
responsibility for managing and administering its securities arbitration forums to its
wholly-owned subsidiary, NASD Regulation, Inc. (NASDR). The NASDR was created
in January 1996 to provide regulation and member and constituent services, with the
NASD retaining general oversight responsibility for the effectiveness of the self-
regulatory and business operations of the NASD along with final policymaking
authority. See id.
8 See National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Regulation, NASD Regulation Statistics (last
modified Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.nasdr.com/2380.htm>; see also PIABA, supra
note 1, at 2.
9 Mary L. Schapiro, Owen Distinguished Lecture Series, Vanderbilt University,
Nashville, Tennessee, April 3, 1996 (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.nasdr.com/
1420/schapiro_01.htm> (emphasis added).
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the decisionmaker, i.e., the arbitrator. 10 This is especially important where
arbitrators are not appointed by a party perceived as neutral. 11
Prior to November 17, 1998, investor perception that the NASD
arbitrator selection process was biased in favor of the securities industry
was reasonable because the NASD appointed arbitrators to serve on panels
from its pool of arbitrators with almost no input by the parties. 12 This
process was problematic because it meant that arbitrators were appointed by
only one of the parties to the dispute-the securities industry. Investors
required to use the NASD arbitral forum felt that they were not treated
fairly in this securities industry-sponsored arbitral forum because they
perceived arbitrators selected primarily by the NASD as biased in favor of
the securities industry. 13 In a 1996 report to the NASD, the Arbitration
Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors14 of the NASD (NASD Task
Force) 15 found that "participants [were] concerned that the selection
process reflect[ed NASD] staff bias and prejudgment... "16 and that "the
10 See 3 IAN MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS,
AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 27:3 (1995 & Supp. 1997);
see also McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58, 68 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing
to enforce an arbitration agreement that designated an arbitration panel institutionally
linked to or chosen by one party, especially if that party drafted the underlying
agreement); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp.
190, 209 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd, 163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998), superseded by 170 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1999); ROBERT M. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION wrrH FORMS
§ 9.3, at 237 (1984).
11 See McConnell, 818 F.2d at 68 n.12; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 209.
12 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rules 10302(f), 10308, 10309,
10311 (National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998); see also
ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 93; David A. Lipton, Discovery
Procedures and the Selection and Training of Arbitrators: A Study of Securities Industry
Practices, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 435, 438 (1988).
13 See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 93; GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 4 n.6; PIABA, supra note 1, at 4, 10.
14 The Board of Governors is the governing board of the NASD. See NATIONAL
ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., supra note 7, at 1012.
15 In September 1994, the NASD appointed an Arbitration Policy Task Force to
study its securities arbitration process and to make suggestions for its reform. The
NASD Task Force had eight members with various backgrounds in securities
arbitration. NASD Task Force members were the following: David S. Ruder, Linda D.
Fienberg, John W. Bachmann, Stephen J. Friedman, Stephen L. Hammerman, J. Boyd
Page, Francis 0. Spalding, and Richard E. Speidel. See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
16 Id. at 93.
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
ARBITRATOR SELECTION AT THE NASD
arbitration process [was] industry controlled." 17 The NASD Task Force
specifically noted that "[t]he selection of arbitrators for a case should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety. .. [and that] the NASD's current
procedures for arbitrator selection and disqualification in [investor-industry]
disputes [did] not meet this test." 18
In contrast to arbitral norms and practice, 19 the NASD exercised a
predominant role in determining the composition of the pool of available
arbitrators2° and in appointing the arbitrators who would hear the particular
dispute between the investor and member of the securities industry. 21 To
effectively address the issue of perceived bias in favor of the securities
industry in the NASD's arbitrator selection process, the NASD Task Force
recommended that the NASD adopt a list selection method for choosing
arbitrators.22
In response to investor perception of a pro-securities industry bias and
NASD Task Force recommendations, the NASD implemented a list
selection method for selecting arbitrators in its arbitral forum effective
November 17, 1998. The NASD, along with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (Commission),23 contends that these new
procedures for appointing arbitrators effectively address the issue of
investor perceived bias in favor of the securities industry in the NASD
arbitrator selection process.
With the massive movement of Americans into the securities markets,
the mechanism used to resolve disputes between investors and members of
the securities industry is becoming increasingly important. Americans,
17 Id. at 94.
18 Id.
19 Arbitral norms and practices require that arbitrators be impartial and
independent of the parties before them. See Gaer Bros. v. Mott, 130 A.2d 804, 807.
(Conn. 1957); American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 148 N.E. 562,
564 (N.Y. 1925); George A. Fuller Co. v. Albin Gustafson Co., 390 N.Y.S.2d 416,
417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Thomas v. Howard, 276 S.E.2d 743, 745 (N.C. Ct. App.
1981).
2 0 See NASD CODE OF ARBrIRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10102(a) (National Ass'n
of See. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
21 See id. Rules 10302, 10308 (amended 1,998).
2 2 See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 94-97.
23 All NASD rules governing securities arbitration must be approved by the
Commission, an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial agency charged with the
responsibility of regulating the U.S. securities markets. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, §§ 15A, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78s (1999).
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more than ever before, are responsible for their own financial security and
are relying on the financial markets to generate retirement income, to
educate their children, and to produce savings. Assets of mutual funds of
all types have grown from $371 billion in 1984 to more than $5 trillion. 24
This trend most likely will continue. Even President Clinton is relying on
investing in the securities markets to shore up Social Security. In his State
of the Union address, the President recommended setting up Universal
Savings Accounts that would allow workers to invest in stock and bond
mutual funds to supplement Social Security benefits. 25
The purpose of this Article is to assess carefully whether the new
arbitrator selection rules effectively address the issue of investor perceived
bias in favor of the securities industry in the NASD arbitrator selection
process. First, the Article will briefly discuss the history of NASD
sponsored securities arbitration focusing on the method used to select
arbitrators. Second, it will evaluate the arbitrator selection method used by
the NASD prior to the implementation of the current list selection method;
this is important to any analysis of the new arbitrator selection rules
because only the arbitrator selection rules governing the appointment of
arbitrators to serve on panels were amended. Third, it will describe the new
list selection method and evaluate whether it sufficiently addresses the issue
of investor perceived bias in favor of the securities industry in the NASD
arbitrator selection process.
II. HISTORY OF NASD-SPONSORED ARBITRATION
A. Background
Prior to 1987, arbitration was not a legitimate mechanism for resolving
disputes between investors and the securities industry. In Wilko v. Swan,26
the Court reasoned that predispute arbitration agreements violated the
policy of investor protection stated in the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) because such agreements required investors to waive their statutory
24 See Brian Reid & Kimberlee Miller, Mutual Fund Developments in 1998,
PERSP., Feb. 1999, at 1, 2.
25 See President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address, Jan. 19,
1999 (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990119-
2656.html>.
26 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
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right to a judicial remedy.27 However, in 1987, the Court determined in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon28 that arbitration was an
adequate substitute for judicial resolution of disputes between investors and
the securities industry; the Court reasoned that the mistrust of arbitration
that formed the basis for the Wilko decision was no longer applicable
because, since the 1975 amendments to section 19 of the Exchange Act, the
Commission "has had expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the
arbitration procedures employed by the SROs [including the NASD]" 29 and
that "where the [Commission] has sufficient statutory authority to ensure
that arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act
rights .... agreements to arbitrate Exchange Act claims" 30  are
enforceable. Two years later, the Court expressly overruled Wilko in
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,31 holding that
predispute arbitration agreements were enforceable in claims arising under
the Securities Act. After McMahon and Rodriguez, most securities disputes
between investors and brokers or dealers are now arbitrated under
mandatory predispute' arbitration agreements. 32
However, in 1992, Congress became concerned about whether
securities industry-sponsored arbitration is fair to investors. "A primary
concern is that arbitration at an industry-sponsored forum may have a pro-
industry bias." 33 This issue was especially pressing because the member
brokerage firm could refuse to open a securities brokerage account for an
investor if she refused to sign a predispute resolution agreement requiring
27 Although the Wilko holding only involved the Securities Act, most courts also
applied its holding to agreements to arbitrate future disputes arising under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that the arbitration agreement
was overridden by antiwaiver provision of federal securities laws); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978)
(same); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 558 F.2d 831, 835
(7th Cir. 1977) (same); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538
F.2d 532, 536 & n.121 (3d Cir. 1976) (same); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (same).
28 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2 9 Id. at 233.
30 Id. at 238.
31 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
32 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 19; Katsoris, supra note 3,
at 483.
33 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 4.
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her to arbitrate all future disputes. As a consequence, Congress34 asked the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to, among other things, analyze the
results of securities arbitration at industry-sponsored forums (including the
NASD) and to compare these results with those of the AAA, the primary
independent forum for securities arbitration.
The GAO found that an investor was no more likely to prevail in an
independent than an industry-sponsored arbitral forum. But it recognized
that its study "did not directly address the fairness of the arbitration
process." 35 The GAO determined that investor confidence in arbitration
depends on the investors' perceptions of the fairness and expertise of those
who decide the cases-the arbitrators .... "36 Moreover, it noted that even
the Commission recognized that allowing investors the option of using an
arbitral forum independent from the securities industry, such as the AAA,
would improve investors' perception of fairness in securities arbitration. 37
B. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
Arbitration proceedings between NASD members and investors are
conducted pursuant to the NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure (NASD
Code), which is written primarily by the securities industry.38 All NASD
arbitration panels consist of one or three arbitrators and must have a
majority of public arbitrators unless the parties agree to a different
composition. Prior to November 17, 1998, arbitrators were appointed by a
34 This request was made by the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce and its Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, and the
Chairman and four members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 4.
35 Id. at6.
36 1d. at 55.
37 See id. at 60. Although the GAO findings were applicable to all securities
industry arbitral forums, they were especially relevant to the NASD arbitral forum in
light of the fact that most arbitration proceedings between investors and member firms
are conducted in the NASD arbitral forum.
38 See NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., supra note 7, at 7511. The
NASD Code is based on the Uniform Code of Arbitration developed by the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA). SICA is composed predominantly of
representatives from SROs and the Securities Industry Association but has four public
members. See Katsoris, supra note 2, at 314; see also SECURITIEs INDUS. CONFERENCE
ON ARBITRATION, SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION REPORT
NUMBER SIX 1, 5-12 (1989) (setting forth the most recent version of the Uniform Code
of Arbitration).
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member of the NASD staff or the Director of Arbitration, or, in
arbitrations involving large and complex cases, were chosen using a method
designated by the parties. 39 All arbitrators appointed to panels were
selected from the NASD pool of arbitrators, which was established and
maintained by the National Arbitration and Mediation Committee of the
Board of Governors of the NASD. 40 Arbitrators were classified as either
public (not from the securities industry)41 or securities industry arbitrators
(either employed by or retired from the securities industry or representing
securities industry clients)42 in the NASD arbitrator pool. The NASD Code
permitted the Director of Arbitration to use his or her discretion in
selecting arbitrators from the NASD arbitrator pool. 43
In January 1996, the NASD Task Force determined, among other
things, that investors were concerned that the NASD staff exercised too
much influence in the composition of the arbitration panels. Specifically,
the NASD Task Force found the following: (1) investors were "concerned
39 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rules 10308, 10334 (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998). Under NASD Rule 10334 for large
and complex cases, parties may allow the NASD staff to appoint the arbitrator, may use
a list selection method described in subparagraph (c) of Rule 10334, or may agree upon
any other method. See id. Rule 10334 (amended 1998).
40 See id. Rule 10102. This has not changed under the new arbitrator selection
rules effective November 17, 1998.
41 A public arbitrator was defined as a person who was not from the securities
industry and could not be a spouse or other member of the household of a person who
was associated with a member of the NASD or other broker or dealer. See id. Rule
10308 (amended 1998).
42 An individual was classified as a securities industry arbitrator if he or she was
any of the following: (a) currently, or within the first three years, associated with a
member of the NASD or other broker or dealer; (b) retired from a member of the
NASD or other broker or dealer; (c) a professional, such as an attorney or accountant,
who devoted twenty percent or more of her professional work effort to securities
industry clients within the last two years; or (d) registered under the Commodity
Exchange Act or a member of a registered futures association or any commodities
exchange or associated with any such person. See id.
43 See id. The NASD Director of Arbitration selected arbitrators from its pool of
arbitrators "[aifter determining the type of controversy... in accordance with the
skills and expertise necessary to decide the case." DAvID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES
ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 10.4, at 10-9 (2d ed. 1996) (citing Edward W.
Morris, Jr. & Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration at Self-Regulatory
Organizations: New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. Administration and Procedures, in SEcuRrnis ARBrrRATION 1990, at
181, 195 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6932, 1990)).
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that the current selection process utilized by the NASD reflected staff bias
and prejudgment" and therefore a pro-securities industry bias and (2)
investors had "limited input on the choice of arbitrators" on the panel. 44 It
also noted that under the arbitrator selection process in effect prior to
November 17, 1998, "for investors and their counsel, the current procedure
further reinforces their perception that the arbitration process is industry
controlled." 45 Noting that the. selection of arbitrators for a case should
avoid even the appearance of impropriety and based on comments received
indicating that the NASD's arbitrator selection procedures prior to
November 17, 1998 did not meet this test, the NASD Task Force
recommended the use of a list selection method to select arbitrators. 46
In summary, prior to November 17, 1998, the impartiality of
arbitrators in the NASD's arbitral forum was rightfully called into question
because of the dominant role the NASD played in determining the pool of
available arbitrators, selecting from the pool of available arbitrators, and
appointing arbitrators to hear claims against NASD member firms. Even
though the NASD asserted that it always appointed a majority of public
arbitrators, this too was questionable because the NASD wrote and
implemented the rules classifying arbitrators as either public or securities
industry arbitrators. Clearly, there was more than a reasonable basis for
investors to perceive that the arbitrator selection process reflected a pro-
securities industry bias. Moreover, given the disparity in bargaining power
between investors and members of the securities industry, most investors
were forced to abide by the NASD arbitrator selection rules in order to
participate in the United States securities markets.
In an attempt to dispel the perception that the selection of arbitrators in
the NASD arbitral forum is dominated by the securities industry, the NASD
changed its rules governing the appointment of arbitrators to serve on
arbitration panels effective November 17, 1998. The NASD, along with the
Commission, asserts that its newly enacted arbitrator selection rules should
eliminate the perception held by investors that the securities industry
dominates the arbitrator selection process, resulting in arbitrator decisions
biased in favor of the securities industry. An analysis of the arbitrator
44 ARIrrRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 93. The NASD Task Force
also found that there was a shortage of trained, available arbitrators, which intensified
issues concerning the NASD arbitrator selection process. See id. at 11. This Article
will address only issues pertaining to the selection of arbitrators.
45 Id. at 94.
46 See id. The NASD Task Force also recommended greater flexibility in
classifying arbitrators. See id.
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selection rules in effect prior to November 17, 1998 is necessary to
determine whether this is indeed the case, i.e., whether the newly enacted
arbitrator selection rules are sufficient to correct for the fact that one party
(the member brokerage firm) is institutionally linked to the arbitral forum,
which not only writes the rules governing the arbitrator selection process,
but also controls the pool from which arbitrators are selected.
II. NASD ARBITRATOR SELECTION BEFORE
NOVEMBER 17, 199847
An analysis of the rules of the NASD Code governing arbitrator
selection in disputes between investors and the securities industry prior to
November 17, 1998, indicates a reasonable basis for the conclusion that the
arbitrator selection process was dominated by the securities industry and
that arbitrators were chosen primarily by one party-the securities industry.
There was at least an appearance of impropriety because investors had no
meaningful opportunity to participate in the arbitrator selection process.
Arbitral norms and practices require that arbitrators have no connection
with the parties that might give the appearance of their not being
completely impartial. 48 Moreover, "both parties to a dispute must have an
equal right to control the appointment of the arbitral panel, and neither side
should play a disproportionate role in the decisionmaking" 49 process. The
right to appoint arbitrators to serve on the panel is almost never given to
one side;50 some courts have refused to enforce arbitration agreements that
47 All references to NASD Rule 10308 in this Part refer to NASD Rule 10308 in
effect prior to November 17, 1998.
48 See RODMAN, supra note 10, § 9.9, at 244; see also Tim ARBrrRATOR'S
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 3.
49 Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190,
208 (D. Mass. 1998).
5 0 See Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARv. L. Rv.
1670, 1686 (1996); see also SEC. ARBrrRATION Rule 14 (American Arbitration Ass'n
1993); George H. Friedman, The New Securities Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association, in SECURrEs ARBrTRATION 1993: PRODUCTS, PROCEDURES,
AND CAUSES OF ACTION, at 23, 27 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7036, 1993); Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 Oio ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL., 37, 53 (1996).
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designate a panel institutionally linked to or chosen by one party, especially
if that party drafted the underlying agreement. 51
But this one-sided control of the panel was exactly the case in disputes
between investors and members of the securities industry prior to
November 17, 1998. One party, the member brokerage firm, dominated the
weaker party, the investor. In order to participate in the United States
securities markets, most investors were required to sign an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes with the member brokerage firm. Furthermore, this
mandatory predispute agreement was drafted by the member brokerage
firm. Finally, the member brokerage firm was a paying member of the
institution (the NASD) that administered and controlled the arbitral forum
and wrote the rules governing the selection of arbitrators. As a result,
arbitrator selection procedures under the NASD Code could not meet
minimal standards of arbitral independence.
Securities industry domination and control began very early in the
process, with the composition of the arbitrator pool from which the
Director of Arbitration appointed arbitrators, and continued throughout the
appointment process. 52 The NASD determined who was appointed from the
pool to decide disputes between its members and investors. It also
determined who was admitted to the pool of arbitrators from which
arbitrators were selected to serve on panels.
Although the NASD Code required that the majority of arbitrators
serving on a panel be public arbitrators, i.e., not from the securities
industry, the classification of the arbitrators in the NASD pool as public
arbitrators or securities industry arbitrators was performed solely by the
NASD pursuant to rules prescribed in the NASD Code.53 This practice
continues under the newly enacted arbitrator selection rules, and the
classification rules remain basically the same. In other words, the newly
enacted arbitrator selection rules primarily focus on the rules governing the
appointment of arbitrators to serve on arbitration panels; they do not
remove the nexus of control of the composition of the arbitrator pool from
the NASD.
The NASD Code is silent regarding the standards that form the basis
for its decisions about whom to include or to exclude from its arbitrator
pool. Classification of arbitrators in the pool is important because this area
51 See McConnell v. Howard Univ., 818 F.2d 58, 68 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
MACNEIL, supra note 10, §§ 28.2.5.2, 28:36 & n.106.
52 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rules 10102-10104 (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
53 See id. Rule 10308 (amended 1998).
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of securities industry control could reasonably be perceived by investors as
an avenue to stack the entire NASD arbitrator roster in favor of the
securities industry. This could undermine the effectiveness of the newly
enacted arbitrator selection rules in eliminating investor perceived bias in
favor of the securities industry in the NASD arbitrator selection process.
The balance of this Part will be used to evaluate the arbitrator selection
rules in effect prior to November 17, 1998, beginning with the arbitrator
classification rules.
A. Arbitrator Classification Before November 17, 1998
Prior to November 17, 1998, the rules distinguishing public and
securities industry arbitrators in the NASD pool of arbitrators gave rise to a
seemingly meaningless distinction under the NASD Code. Furthermore,
these classification rules were not effective in avoiding even the appearance
of impropriety; arbitrators could be misclassified as public arbitrators in the
pool54 because the rules were based on arbitrary assumptions that caused
the classification scheme to be both under-inclusive and over-inclusive,
ambiguous, and very difficult to enforce. Accordingly, public arbitrators
selected by the Director of Arbitration from the pool could be viewed as
biased from the moment they were chosen. In a September 10, 1987 letter
to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), the
Commission stated that "the inclusion in the pool of public arbitrators of
persons with clear affiliations with the securities industry is a source of
great concern." 55 In response, the NASD, with the Commission's approval,
proposed and implemented in 1989 NASD Rule 10308. However, the
NASD's attempt to distinguish between public and industry arbitrators in
NASD Rule 10308(c) was "somewhat arbitrary" 56 and ineffective in
eliminating from the public arbitrator pool those persons with clear
affiliations with the securities industry. In addition, it did not eradicate, as
asserted by the Commission in 1989 when NASD Rule 10308 was initially
54 In an inspection of the NASD Arbitration Department, the Commission noted
several instances in which it believed that arbitrators may have been misclassified as
public arbitrators. See ARBrrRATION PoLIcY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 97.
55 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock
Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute
Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144,
21,146 (1989).
56 ARBITRATION PoLIcY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 96.
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proposed, 57 investors' doubts about the impartiality of the public arbitrator
pool. 58
NASD Rule 10308(c) used arbitrary time designations to determine
whether an individual was biased in favor of the securities industry and
therefore should be classified as a securities industry rather than a public
arbitrator. Sections (c)(1) and (2) of NASD Rule 10308 arbitrarily assumed
that individuals formerly associated with brokers or dealers ceased to be
biased in favor of the securities industry three years after being so
associated. For example, a person formerly associated with a broker or
dealer would be classified as a public arbitrator three years after ceasing to
be associated with the broker or dealer, if she was working outside of the
securities industry and was not retired from the securities industry. This
meant that during the three years immediately after ceasing to be associated
with a broker or dealer, she would be classified .as a securities industry
arbitrator; beginning the fourth year after she had ceased to be employed by
the broker or dealer, she would be classified as a public arbitrator.
However, if the same person were to become associated again with a
broker or dealer five years after being so associated, she would again be
classified as a securities industry arbitrator. NASD Rule 10308(c)
arbitrarily assumed that bias in favor of the securities industry immediately
reappeared the moment an individual again became associated with a broker
or dealer.
NASD Rule 10308(c) also used arbitrary time designations when
classifying professionals (attorneys, accountants, and so on) as either public
or securities industry arbitrators. Professionals were perceived to be biased
only if they devoted twenty percent or more of their professional work
effort to securities industry clients within the last two years. For example,
if, within the last two years, an attorney devoted 19.99% of his
professional work effort to representing clients in the securities industry, he
would not be perceived as biased in favor of the securities industry and
would be classified as a public arbitrator. However, if this same attorney
just one year later began to devote twenty percent of his professional work
effort to representing securities industry clients, he would then be perceived
as biased in favor of the securities industry and classified as an industry
arbitrator in the NASD arbitrator pool. Neither the NASD Code nor related
commentary provide a basis for the assumptions underlying these arbitrary
time designations. Essentially under NASD Rule 10308(c), the same person
57 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,147.
58 See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 94.
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could be classified as a securities industry arbitrator one year and as a
public arbitrator the next year, regardless of actual or perceived bias.
Under NASD Rule 10308(c), the NASD arbitrarily determined that
professionals and persons effecting transactions in commodities required
less time than persons associated with brokers or dealers to eliminate any
biases they might harbor in favor of the securities industry.59 An attorney,
accountant, or other professional was deemed to be no longer biased in
favor of the securities industry after just two years. However, a person
formerly associated with a broker or dealer required three years away from
the securities industry to be no longer biased in favor of the securities
industry. Individuals, registered under the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA), members of registered futures association or any commodities
exchange, or individuals associated with such persons were, apparently,
even less prone to pro-securities industry bias than professionals and other
persons associated with brokers or dealers. These individuals seemingly
ceased to be biased in favor of the securities industry the moment they
discontinued registration under the CEA, or membership with a registered
futures association or commodities exchange. Subsection .(c)(5) of NASD
Rule 10308 allowed such individuals to be classified as public arbitrators in
the NASD arbitrator pool the moment they ceased to be registered or were
no longer members of registered futures associations or commodities
exchanges. 60 This meant that a person who had spent his entire career in
the securities industry could be classified as a public arbitrator in the
NASD arbitrator pool.
NASD Rule 10308(c) was ambiguous and under-inclusive because, in
failing to define the term "retire" (a key term used in its definition of a
securities industry arbitrator), it allowed individuals reasonably perceived
as biased in favor of the securities industry to be classified as public
arbitrators. 61 It was unclear whether a person had to meet certain age or
length of service requirements to retire from the industry or merely had to
leave the industry and not engage in any other work. If the term retire was
defined as requiring certain age or length of service requirements, it
allowed individuals to be classified as public arbitrators who might have
spent the majority of their careers working in the securities industry. This
again may have resulted in at least the perception that individuals affiliated
59 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(1)-(3) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
60 See id. Rule 10308(c)(4) (amended 1998).
61 See id. Rule 10308(c)(3) (amended 1998).
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with or biased in favor of the securities industry were included in the
NASD's pool of public arbitrators. For example, an individual would be
classified as a public arbitrator who worked twenty years in the securities
industry, did not retire from the securities industry, and subsequently
worked outside the securities industry for just over three years. An
individual with this type of background could be perceived as, and could
well be, biased in favor of the securities industry. Accordingly, such
individuals should not be included in the NASD's pool of public arbitrators.
NASD Rule 10308(c) was also over-inclusive because, in failing to
define the term "retire," it likely excluded individuals reasonably perceived
as not biased in favor of the securities industry from the NASD's public
arbitrator pool. An individual was automatically and forever classified as a
securities industry arbitrator if she had retired from the securities industry.
Although it seems logical to assume that if an individual retired from the
securities industry that she would, at least, be perceived as biased in favor
of the securities industry, this is not always the case. Assuming that the
term "retire" means meeting certain age or length of service requirements,
this section would exclude from the public arbitrator pool anyone who had
retired from the securities industry and was subsequently employed, for just
over three years, representing the interests of public investors, e.g.,
working for the Commission. It would also exclude individuals retired from
the securities industry but employed in the securities industry for less than
three years. If time is a material factor in determining the existence of pro-
securities industry bias, it would seem that a person only employed in the
securities industry for less than three years, even though retired from the
securities industry, would not be as biased in favor of the securities
industry as someone whose entire career consisted of working in the
securities industry. For example, a person could have worked for a
government agency clearly dedicated to protecting the interests of public
investors for most of his career, retired from this government agency, then
worked for a securities brokerage firm for one year and, after one year,
retired from the securities brokerage firm.62 NASD Rule 10308(c) would
clearly prohibit this individual from serving as a public arbitrator; however,
given his background, investors might reasonably perceive that this
individual should be classified as a public arbitrator rather than as a
securities industry arbitrator. These types of arbitrary results undermined
the credibility of the pool from which public arbitrators were selected and
62 Indeed, the author, being a former senior counsel at the Commission, personally
knows someone who did just this.
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further fueled the perception by investors that the arbitrator panels were
biased in favor of the securities industry.
Section (c) of NASD Rule 10308 was under-inclusive because it failed
to classify certain members of the securities industry as securities industry
arbitrators. Investment advisers not associated with brokers or dealers,
municipal securities dealers, government securities brokers, or government
securities dealers, were classified as public arbitrators. 63 The NASD
determined that these types of investment advisers "[were] more akin to
investors and should be placed in the public arbitrator pool."64 This meant
that investment advisers associated with other financial firms such as
investment companies and insurance companies would be classified as
public arbitrators in the NASD's pool of arbitrators. The NASD's
classification of investment advisers as public arbitrators was inconsistent
with the Uniform Code of Arbitration (Uniform Code), which bars
investment advisers from serving as public arbitrators. 65 Investment
advisers, like other members of the securities industry, are regulated under
federal and state securities laws. Specifically, investment advisers are
regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act). 66
Under the Advisers Act, an investment adviser is defined as "any person,
who for compensation, engages in the business of advising others... as to
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities .... "67 The Advisers Act is, among other things,
designed to protect the public from fraud or misrepresentation by
investment advisers 68 and requires certain investment advisers to register
63 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(1) (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
64 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock
Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute
Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144,
21,146 (1989).
65 See id. It was also inconsistent with the Arbitration Code of the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), which followed the Uniform Code in classifying
registered investment advisers as securities industry arbitrators. See New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., art. IX, R. 607
(visited Aug. 23, 1999) <http://www.nyse.com/public/invprot//5d/05dl/05dlc/5dlc09
fm.htm>.
66 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1994).
67 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1994).
68 For example, the Advisers Act requires advisers to disclose all potential
conflicts of interest with any recommendations they make to those they advise. See
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with the Commission. 69 In other words, investment advisers are regulated
essentially in the same manner and for the same purpose (the protection of
investors) as brokers or dealers. Accordingly, there seems to be no
reasonable basis for allowing investment advisers to serve as public
arbitrators under the NASD Code.
Professionals, such as attorneys and accountants, in the NASD pool of
public arbitrators were even more likely to be perceived as biased in favor
of the securities industry because section (c)(4) of NASD Rule 10308 only
applied to the individual and not to his firm. This meant that a professional
would be classified as a public arbitrator, but his individual firm would be
free to represent securities industry clients with impunity. For example, an
individual attorney working at a firm who had not represented securities
industry clients within the last two years could be classified as a public
arbitrator while his firm was actively representing securities industry
clients, i.e., devoting more than twenty percent of its work effort to
securities industry clients. However, exclusion from the public arbitrator
pool of attorneys, accountants, or professionals whose partners or firms
regularly provide services to the securities industry would aid in eliminating
the perception of NASD staff bias and prejudgment because the economic
ties between partners gives rise to an appearance of bias.70
Moreover, it is questionable whether work effort alone should be the
primary factor in determining whether to classify an individual as a public
or securities industry arbitrator. An attorney, accountant, or other
professional may devote less than twenty percent of his or her professional
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1) (1994). A potential
conflict of interest might exist where the adviser had a position in a security she was
recommending.
69 Generally, investment advisers with assets under management of not less than
$25,000,000, or who are advisers to registered investment companies, must register
with the Commission. See id. § 80b-3. Investment advisers with assets under
management of less than $25,000,000 may be required to register in the state in which
they maintain their principal office and place of business. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 359-eee (McKinney 1998).
70 See John R. Allison, A Process Value Analysis of Decision-Maker Bias: The
Case of Economic Conflicts of Interest, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 513 (1995). "[The law
traditionally has treated economic interests as the worst form of biasing influence,
particularly in the case of judges." Id. at 514 (citing John Leubsdorf, Theories of
Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237, 245 (1987)). The NYSE
Code of Arbitration Procedure recognizes challenges for cause of lawyers and other
professionals whose partners represent the securities industry. See Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,144.
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work effort to securities industry clients, but this work effort could
represent more than twenty percent of his or her income. In addition,
income from securities industry clients could represent the professional's
greatest source of consistent income. Some combination of work effort and
income derived from representing securities industry clients might be a
better indicator of the presence of bias in favor of the securities industry
when determining whether to classify a professional as either a public or
securities industry arbitrator.
Subsection (d) of NASD Rule 10308 seemingly fueled investor
perception that the NASD arbitrator selection process was biased in favor
of the securities industry because it allowed spouses and other household
members of persons associated with the securities industry to serve as
securities industry arbitrators. It is likely that spouses and household
members qf persons associated with the securities industry would be
perceived as biased in favor of securities industry members even if only
appointed as securities industry arbitrators. Generally, it is appropriately
perceived that such persons' economic interests are closely tied to members
of the securities industry. Although the NASD Code requires "all
arbitrators, both public and industry,... to be neutral, and [to]... have
no affiliation or bias towards either party, '71 prohibiting such individuals
from serving as arbitrators (whether securities industry or public) would
better support this underlying principle. The Uniform Code and the AAA
Code72 prohibit such individuals from serving as public or securities
industry arbitrators.
The distinction between public and securities industry arbitrators was
also difficult to enforce because an arbitrator's status could change from
year to year. Accordingly, it might be "difficult for the NASD to maintain
accurate records of an arbitrator's classification." 73
The author concedes that promulgating arbitrator classification rules
that eliminate ambiguity, under-inclusiveness, and over-inclusiveness is
extremely difficult. A comparison between the rules classifying public and
securities industry arbitrators under the AAA Code and NASD Rule 10308
reveals the difficulty of formulating rules which eliminate real or even
apparent bias. However, investors and their counsel seem to perceive that
the AAA arbitrator selection process is fair and unbiased, 74 despite the fact
71 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,145-46.
72 See SEC. ARBrRATION Rule 13 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
73 ARBITRAnON PoLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 97.
74 See PIABA, supra note 1, at 11-23.
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that its attempt to distinguish between public and securities industry
arbitrators is, like the NASD Code, arbitrary and ambiguous. 75 In fact, the
AAA's classification rules are, like the NASD Code, based on the Uniform
Code.
Rule 13 of the AAA Code (AAA Rule 13) classifies arbitrators as either
affiliated arbitrators (securities industry arbitrators) or not affiliated
arbitrators (public arbitrators). Securities industry arbitrators are defined as
persons out of the securities industry for more than ten years. The phrase
"out of the industry" is not specifically defined under AAA Rule 13. AAA
Rule 13 defines a public arbitrator as a person who has or has had direct
involvement in or a relationship with the securities brokerage industry for a
minimum of three years if currently employed in that industry, or for a
minimum of five years if no longer employed.76 The phrase "involvement
in or relationship with" is defined as "(a) employment at a brokerage firm
in a professional capacity, whether employed in sales, management,
support or trading; or (b) employment as counsel, accountant or other
professional who devotes a majority of his or her efforts to brokerage or
brokerage-related matters." 77
In contrast to NASD Rule 10308, the AAA has determined that if a
person has had no involvement or relationship with the securities industry
for more than ten years, he is qualified to be a neutral or public arbitrator
and would not be perceived by the parties as biased in favor of the
securities industry. Accordingly, securities professionals who have not been
employed in the industry, or have been retired for more than ten years,
would be classified as public arbitrators in the AAA arbitrator pool. The
arbitrary time restriction of ten years allows persons who have spent their
entire careers in the securities industry to be included as public arbitrators
in the AAA arbitrator pool. However, such individuals could not be
classified as public arbitrators in the NASD arbitrator pool. Like the NASD
Code, the AAA Code does not provide a reason for its determination that
ten years is sufficient time for former industry members to eradicate any
real or apparent bias in favor of the securities industry.
The AAA Code is less precise in its definition of the securities industry
than NASD Rule 10308. AAA Rule 13 uses the terms "brokerage,"
"securities brokerage," and "brokerage-related matters," but fails to define
75 It is notable that the NASD Task Force Report did not include a
recommendation to adopt the definitions of public and securities industry arbitrators
under the AAA Code. See ARBrrRATION PoLIcY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 96.
76 See SEC. ARBrrRATION Rule 13 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
77 Id.
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these terms. Consequently, it is unclear who is included in the AAA Code's
definition of securities industry. Based on a reading of the entire text of
AAA Rule 13, it appears that these terms refer to individuals employed by
or associated with such groups as brokers or dealers, municipal securities
dealers, government securities dealers, and their firms. It is not clear,
however, whether terms used to describe the securities industry in AAA
Rule 13 include, for example, investment advisers or members and
associated persons of registered futures associations. In contrast, NASD
Rule 10308 expressly stated those included in its definition of securities
industry as follows: persons associated with brokers or dealers, municipal
securities dealers, government securities brokers or government securities
dealers, and persons registered under the CEA or members and associated
persons of registered futures associations; investment advisers were
specifically excluded. 78 The meaning of the phrase "employment in a
professional capacity" in AAA Rule 13 is also unclear. It cannot be
determined from the text of AAA Rule 13 whether this phrase includes only
those employees who are required to register under the Exchange Act,79 or
others who may be employed in a professional capacity in the securities
industry, e.g., those employees required to register under the CEA or the
Investment Advisers Act. 80
However, AAA Rule 13 is more effective in eliminating economic ties
that create an appearance of bias in its public arbitrator pool. If a
78 The NASD has determined that investment advisers are akin to investors and
therefore would be classified as public arbitrators in its arbitrator pool. See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock Exchange, Inc.
Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,146 (1989).
79 Section 15 of the Exchange Act and Rules 15b1-1 and 15b7-1 thereunder
require brokers or dealers and those persons associated with brokers or dealers to
register with the Commission by filing an application for registration with the Central
Registration Depository operated by the NASD. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Application for Registration of
Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b1-1 (1997); Compliance with Qualification
Requirements of Self-Regulatory Organizations, § 240.15b7-1 (1997). Associated
persons include any partner, officer, director, branch manager, or employee, but
excludes those whose functions are solely clerical or ministerial, i.e., those who are not
engaged in the purchase and sale of securities. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 15(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (1994).
80 Changes made to the AAA Code included an effort to make these rules
applicable to commodities matters. See AMERICAN ARBrrRATION ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssoCIATON SECURTIEs ARBITRATION TASK FORCE 1 (1993).
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professional does not qualify as a securities industry arbitrator under AAA
Rule 13 (employment as counsel, accountant, or other professional who
devotes a majority of her efforts to the securities industry) but her firm
derives significant income from the securities industry, she is excluded
from both public and securities industry arbitrator pools of the AAA. In
contrast, NASD Rule 10308 only targeted the individual at the firm; it did
not reach the firm itself and may have resulted in an individual being
classified as a public arbitrator while being employed at a firm that devoted
most of its work effort to, and derived the greatest consistent source of
income from, the securities industry. AAA Rule 13 also classifies
professionals as public or securities industry arbitrators based on the
amount of income generated from work performed for or in the securities
industry and the amount of work effort devoted to securities industry
clients. AAA Rule 13 prohibits a professional from being classified as a
public arbitrator if the "majority of his or her efforts" is devoted to the
securities industry. Although this phrase is not specifically defined in the
text of AAA Rule 13, according to AAA, "[a] 'majority' . . . would be
administratively defined as more than fifty percent." 8' Although NASD
Rule 10308 was more precise because it expressly stated that professionals
could be classified only as public arbitrators if they devoted less than
twenty percent of their work effort to securities industry clients, its
standard was considerably lower than the AAA Code fifty percent rule.
This is significant because economic ties have been recognized as a
particularly potent form of biasing influence.82 In addition, under AAA
Rule 13, individuals whose family members "derive significant income"
from the securities industry are prohibited from serving as either public
arbitrators or securities industry arbitrators. 83 In contrast, such individuals
were allowed to serve as securities industry arbitrators under NASD Rule
10308. By targeting both the individual and his firm as well as family
members of persons employed in the securities industry, AAA Rule 13
more effectively addresses the issue of the appearance of bias in favor of
the securities industry in its pool of public arbitrators. It attempts to
eliminate economic interests (traditionally treated as one of the strongest
81Id. at5.
82 See Allison, supra note 70, at 513-14; see also Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,146.
83 See AMERICAN ARBrATION Ass'N, supra note 80, at 5.
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forms of biasing influence)84 as a basis for the perception of bias in favor of
the securities industry from its arbitrator pool.
Unlike NASD Rule 10308, AAA Rule 13 does not make classification
distinctions based on time between members of the securities industry and
attorneys, accountants, and other professionals representing securities
industry clients. These individuals are subject to the same time restrictions
with respect to their direct involvement in or relationship with the securities
brokerage industry-a minimum of three years or, if previously employed
at, or not currently representing, a securities brokerage firm, a minimum of
five years.85 In contrast, NASD Rule 10308 presumed that a shorter period
of time (one year) was required for professionals *to eradicate any bias,
apparent or otherwise, in favor of the securities industry. Accordingly,
professionals could be classified as public arbitrators after only one year,
while members of the securities industry required three years. It is
reasonable for investors to perceive that both members of the securities
industry and those representing securities industry clients would be
susceptible to the same influences when determining whether bias in favor
of the securities industry has ceased; therefore, different time restrictions
probably are not warranted. Given the text of AAA Rule 13, the AAA has
apparently also determined that this is a reasonable assumption.
In summary, even though the AAA arbitrator selection process is
perceived by investors as fair and unbiased, this perception cannot be based
on the clarity and conciseness of its arbitrator classification rules. When
compared to the arbitrator classification .rules under NASD Rule 10308,
AAA Rule 13 contains equally arbitrary assumptions and ambiguous key
terms. It seems that when arbitrators are admitted to a pool of arbitrators
selected and classified by a securities industry association such as the
NASD, individuals admitted to such an entity's arbitrator pool are
perceived to be biased in favor of the securities industry association no
matter how the classification rules are crafted. This may mean that the
NASD's continuing efforts to write and implement rules ensuring the
impartiality of individuals admitted to its arbitrator pool may be a futile
endeavor. Securities industry-composed and industry-administered
84 See Allison, supra note 70, at 514; see also Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,146.
85 In this instance, AAA Rule 13 seemingly focuses more on whether an individual
is qualified to serve as an industry arbitrator rather than what is required to eliminate an
appearance of bias in favor of the securities industry. However, as previously noted, if
the individual has been out of the industry for more than ten years, she is classified as a
public arbitrator.
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arbitrator pools may forever be perceived by investors as consisting of
arbitrators whose impartiality is questionable.
1. Investor Perception of Pro-Securities Industry Bias
Arbitrator classification rules under NASD Rule 10308 seemingly
fueled public customer perception that the NASD pool of arbitrators
(whether classified as public or industry) was biased in favor of, and
possibly dominated by, the securities industry. Recommendations made by
the NASD Task Force did not directly address this issue. Instead, its
recommendations emphasized quality, rather than meaningful classification
rules. In the author's opinion, this seems the only reasonable course of
action when the securities industry is making judgments as to the
impartiality of arbitrators serving in its pool of arbitrators.
Specifically, the NASD Task Force recommended that the NASD retain
its existing rules defining public and securities industry arbitrators, but use
three categories of arbitrators instead of the two categories of arbitrators
(securities industry and public) used in NASD Rule 10308. The first
category would consist of public arbitrators qualified to be panel chairs. 86
In this category, the public arbitrator must "demonstrate a strong command
of NASD arbitration procedure and general arbitration techniques, as well
as familiarity with ... industry practices and substantive law." 87 The
second category would also consist of public arbitrators, but without panel
chair qualifications.88 The third category would consist of securities
industry arbitrators. 89 However, these three categories were defined using
the existing classification rules under NASD Rule 10308. As a result, the
categories would be just as "arbitrary and difficult to enforce." 90
Recognizing the fact that any attempt to distinguish more clearly
between public and securities industry arbitrators would possibly require
additional "arbitrary assumptions," the NASD Task Force instead focused
on quality, i.e., "recruiting arbitrators who are qualified and likely to be
acceptable to all parties." 91 The NASD Task Force further contended that
86 See ARBITRATION PoLicY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 95.
87 1d. at 111.
88 See id. at 95.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 96.
91 Id. at 97.
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"[r]emoving some of the definitional barriers" 92 would allow the NASD to
focus its recruiting efforts on quality "regardless of the particular details of
[the arbitrators'] backgrounds. ... -93 While quality is essential to a fair
and impartial arbitrator selection process, assuring the independence of
arbitrators in the context of arbitrator classification rules, i.e., that
arbitrators are impartial and not dominated by the securities industry, is
equally important. As noted in the GAO Report, "the fairness of any
arbitration proceeding depends largely on the independence and capability
of the arbitrators." 94
In conclusion, the arbitrator classification rules of NASD Rule 10308
were fatally flawed because they were based on arbitrary assumptions and
certain key terms were either ambiguous or undefined. The author concedes
that arbitrary assumptions and ambiguity are probably unavoidable when
attempting to classify individuals as either public or securities industry
arbitrators. However, the author suggests that investor perception of pro-
securities industry bias in the arbitrator classification process could be
avoided if the arbitrator classification process were removed from a
securities industry arbitral forum, i.e., that an organization other than the
NASD should be responsible for the composition and classification of the
arbitrator pool used in securities arbitration proceedings between investors
and the securities industry. Under NASD Rule 10308, the distinction
between public and securities industry arbitrators was critical because a
single entity, the NASD, established the qualifications for arbitrators
deciding disputes between investors and its members. One of the basic
principles in qualifying arbitrators is that no single entity should establish
qualifications for all arbitrators in all settings. 95 Accordingly, it is likely
that distinguishing between public and securities industry arbitrators is not
the determining factor in the perceived fairness of the arbitrator selection
process under the NASD Code. The determining factor is most likely that
the entity establishing the rules for qualifying individuals to be admitted to
the pool of arbitrators from which panels are appointed to resolve disputes
between investors and members of the securities industry is not independent
of the securities industry itself.
92Id.
93 Id.
94 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 60 (emphasis added).
95 See SPIDR COMM'N ON QUALIFICATIONS, SOCIETY OF PROF'LS IN DIsPUTE
RE-SOLUTION, ENSURING COhMPNCE AND QUALrTY IN DisPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE
1 (1995).
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B. Arbitrator Appointment Process Before November 17, 199896
Prior to November 17, 1998, the process used by the Director of
Arbitration to appoint arbitrators to serve on NASD arbitration panels was
reasonably perceived by investors to be structurally linked to, and
dominated by, the securities industry. 97 The selection of arbitrators to serve
on the panel, and frequently the chairperson of the panel, were determined
almost exclusively by the Director of Arbitration. 98 Accordingly, the
Director of Arbitration's "selections [had] a significant impact on the
composition of the panel." 99 The NASD Code provided minimal guidance
to the Director of Arbitration in selecting arbitrators to serve on the panel,
requiring only that the individual selected be "knowledgeable" about the
securities industry. The NASD Task Force determined that the "NASD
arbitration staff attempt[ed] to select panel members who [were] well suited
to the nature of the case they [would] hear."1 00 As a result, the Director of
Arbitration had enormous discretionary power at the onset of the
proceedings because she could appoint arbitrators basically without any
constraints. 101 Parties could participate in the arbitrator selection process
only by exercising a single peremptory challenge, after which the Director
of Arbitration selected a replacement. Otherwise, participating in the
selection of a single arbitrator or in determining the final composition of the
panel could be accomplished only by challenging for cause. 102 Even this
participation was limited from the parties' perspective because the Director
96 All references to NASD Rule 10308 in this subpart refer to NASD Rule 10308
in effect prior to November 17, 1998.
97 As previously noted, this is not the case in the arbitration of large and complex
cases under NASD Rule 10334. See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule
10334 (National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
98 See id. Rules 10308, 10309 (amended 1998).
99 ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 93.
100 Id.
101 The GAO determined that arbitrators were selected from the pool of public and
securities industry arbitrators based on availability, the appearance of no conflict of
interest, and experience in products or issues similar to those in the particular dispute.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 56.
102 See NASD CODE OF ARBIrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10311 (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
ARBITRATOR SELECTION AT THE NASD
of Arbitration also decided challenges for cause until the commencement of
the hearing. 10 3
Structural bias in the arbitrator appointment process under NASD Rule
10308 was heightened by the fact that the parties received a slate of only
three names (two public arbitrators, one of whom would be the
chairperson, and one securities industry arbitrator) for a three person panel
and only one name for a one person panel upon which to exercise a single
peremptory challenge and challenges for cause; however, successfully
exercising a challenge for cause was difficult because the criteria were not
easily met. 104 The NASD Task Force determined that successfully
exercising challenges for cause was particularly difficult for pro se parties
because they might not have access to the type of information required to
successfully challenge an arbitrator for cause. 105 Even the private securities
103 See id. 10311, 10313 (amended 1998). "Parties in arbitration could move for
recusal of an arbitrator. However, as in civil litigation, most parties are reluctant, for
tactical reasons, to do so-namely, that the arbitrator could deny the motion and then
be the decision-maker in the matter." ARBrrRATiON PoLIcY TASK FORCE, supra note 1,
at 93 n. 129.
104 Examples of circumstances in which a challenge for cause would be granted
included the following:
1. Opinion and bias: The arbitrator has an unqualified opinion or belief as to the
subject of an action for which he or she is an arbitrator, or the arbitrator has a
personal bias toward a party.
2. Business or personal relationships: The arbitrator is related by blood or
marriage to any of the parties, attorneys, or witnesses in the arbitration, or the
arbitrator is in some way related to the party by means of employment, a debtor or
creditor relationship, or the arbitrator is a business partner, a surety, or guarantor
of the obligations of any party, or a bondholder or shareholder of any corporate
party.
3. Previous or current involvement: The arbitrator is an adverse party in any action
to a party, attorney, or witness in the subject arbitration, or has been accused by
such party in another action instituted or resolved within the last five years, or the
arbitrator and any party, or the attorney for any party, have been in the relation of
attorney and client within five years of the filing of the subject arbitration.
4. Financial interests: The arbitrator knows that he or she has, individually or as a
fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household has
a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
arbitration proceeding, or any other interests that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the arbitration proceedings.
ROBBINs, supra note 43, § 10.06, at 10-13 to 10-14.
105 See ARBITRATION PouIcY TASK FORcE, supra note 1, at 94.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
bar found this process contentious because it lead to sharp criticism and
frequent exchanges of correspondence with counsel for both sides. 106
To address the issue of structural bias reflected in the fact that
arbitrators in the NASD arbitral forum were chosen primarily by the
securities industry, the NASD Task Force recommended that the NASD
adopt a variant of the AAA's list selection process of appointing arbitrators
to serve on arbitration panels. 107 Apparently, investors and their attorneys
perceive the AAA arbitrator selection method to be fair and unbiased,
allowing for equal participation by the parties. 108
The AAA Code uses a list selection method to appoint arbitrators to
serve on panels in arbitration proceedings between investors and members
of the securities industry.1 09 Under Rule 14 of the AAA Code (AAA Rule
14), two lists of names and biographical information of persons chosen
from the AAA's National Panel of Securities Arbitrators are sent
simultaneously to each party to the dispute immediately after the filing of
the demand for arbitration. The first list, from which one arbitrator is
appointed, contains names of securities industry arbitrators. 110 The second
list, from which two arbitrators are appointed, contains names of arbitrators
not affiliated with the securities industry or public arbitrators. 111 Each party
has twenty days from the transmittal date in which to strike any names
objected to, number the remaining names in order of preference, and return
the list to the AAA. If a party does not return the list within the time
specified, all persons on the list are deemed acceptable to that party. 112
The AAA appoints the arbitrators who will serve from persons who
have been approved on both lists and in accordance with the designated
order of mutual preference indicated by the parties. If appointments cannot
be made from the submitted lists, the AAA uses an abbreviated list method.
Under this method, parties are given a final, prescreened list of proposed
106 See PIABA, supra note 1, at 4-5.
107 See ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 94.
108 "To improve the public's perception of fairness, SEC has urged broker-dealer
firms to allow investors the option of using AAA as an arbitration forum." GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 60; see also PIABA, supra note 1, at 10.
109 If the parties have not appointed an arbitrator and have not provided any other
method of appointment, the arbitrator is appointed utilizing the list selection method.
See SEC. ARBrrRATION Rule 14 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
110 See id. The AAA uses the phrase "arbitrators affiliated with the securities
industry" when referring to securities industry arbitrators. Id.
111 See id. AAA Rule 14 does not state how many names must appear on each list.
112 See id.
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arbitrators, consisting of a limited number of names (as an administrative
practice, three names would be proposed for each vacancy). 113 Each
separately appearing party may strike, on a peremptory basis, one name for
each arbitrator to be appointed; the list must be returned to the AAA within
ten days from the date of transmittal. The AAA then makes the
appointments from names remaining on the list. This abbreviated list
method is only used by the AAA after the list selection method has failed to
seat a complete panel.
In contrast, the arbitrator appointment process under NASD Rule
10308 did not provide for meaningful participation by the parties and,
appropriately, fueled investor perception of a pro-securities industry bias.
Unlike NASD Rule 10308, AAA Rule 14 allows the parties meaningful
participation in the arbitrator appointment process because each party can
strike any objectionable names on the lists and is not confined to the
exercise of only one peremptory challenge plus challenges for cause. 114 In
comparison, .for a three person panel under NASD Rule 10308, the
Director of Arbitration only provided the parties with a slate of three names
upon which the parties could exercise only one peremptory challenge plus
challenges for cause. If a panel was not completed, the Director of
Arbitration was only required to submit one name per vacancy to the
parties, 115 instead of the three names per vacancy required 'under AAA
Rule 14 when its list selection method failed to seat a complete panel.
It is interesting that investors and their counsel perceive the AAA
arbitrator selection process to be fair and unbiased even in small claims
cases, in which the AAA does not use the list selection process described
above. In fact, both permit only limited input by the parties in the selection
of arbitrators. 116 Under both the AAA Code and the NASD Code, unless
the parties object, all claims less than $25,000 (exclusive of interest and
arbitration costs) are heard by a single public arbitrator. 117 Under the AAA
113 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 80, at 4.
114 As previously noted, the Director of Arbitration may award additional
peremptory challenges if he determines that the "interest of justice would be best served
by awarding additional peremptory challenges." NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE Rule 10311 (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
115 See id. Rules 10309, 10311 (amended 1998).
116 See id. Rule 10302 (amended 1998); see also SEC. ARBITRATION Rule 52
(American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
117 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDuRE Rule 10302 (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998); SEC. ARBITRATION Rule 18 (American
Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
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Code, this single public arbitrator is chosen by, first, selecting five
proposed public arbitrators drawn from the AAA's National Panel of
Securities Arbitrators and submitting this list of names simultaneously to
each party." 8 Next, each party may strike two names from the list on a
peremptory basis and has unlimited challenges for cause. Then, AAA
appoints a single arbitrator from the names remaining on the list.119 If for
any reason the appointment of an arbitrator cannot be made from this list,
the AAA may make the appointment from among other members of its
National Panel of Securities Arbitrators without the submission of
additional lists to the parties. Similarly, under the NASD Code, the
Director of Arbitration appoints a single public arbitrator to hear the case.
The public arbitrator is appointed in the sole discretion of the Director of
Arbitration; the NASD Code requires only that the Director of Arbitration
appoint a public arbitrator from the NASD arbitrator pool who is
"knowledgeable in the securities industry." 1 20 Parties participate in this
appointment process only by exercising a single peremptory challenge and
challenges for cause. 121
Both the NASD Code and AAA Code leave the selection of arbitrators
for small claims essentially within the discretion of their staff. The only
notable difference between the two codes is that the AAA Code submits
five names for consideration to the parties and allows two peremptory
challenges per party, while the NASD Code submits only one name to the
parties and allows one peremptory challenge per party; the Director of
Arbitration then appoints an arbitrator to decide the case. Both the AAA
Code and the NASD Code allow unlimited challenges for cause.1 22
Basically, the securities industry, through its industry association, the
NASD, exercises unfettered discretion in the appointment of arbitrators in
arbitration proceedings involving small claims.
In summary, NASD procedures for appointment of arbitrators to serve
on panels failed to "avoid even the appearance of impropriety" 123 and
reasonably fueled public customer perception that the arbitrator
118 See SEC. ARBITRATION Rule 52 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
119 See id.
120 NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10302(f) (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
121 See id. Rule 10311 (amended 1998).
122 See id.; SEC. ARBITRATION Rule 20 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
123 ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 94.
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
ARBITRATOR SELECTION AT THE NASD
appointment process, and possibly NASD arbitrators, were biased in favor
of the securities industry.
IV. THE CURRENT NASD ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS
Recognizing that the legitimacy of the NASD arbitral forum depended
significantly on lessening investor perception that the arbitrator selection
process was biased in favor of the securities industry, the NASD amended
its rules governing the selection of arbitrators. 124 Effective November 17,
1998, NASD Rule 10308 was amended to "[allow] the parties to play the
dominate [sic] role in selecting their arbitrators." 125 According to the
NASD and the Commission, the new arbitrator selection rules should
effectively address difficulties noted by the NASD Task Force in its review
of the NASD arbitrator selection process-the appearance of impropriety
because of perceived NASD staff bias and prejudgment and no meaningful
participation by the parties.
Specifically, NASD Rule 10308 was amended (amended NASD Rule
10308) to provide for a list selection method for appointing arbitrators to
serve on panels; arbitrators are now placed on the lists on a rotating
basis.126 But though amended NASD Rule 10308 no longer allows
appointment of arbitrators to panels solely in the discretion of the Director
of Arbitration, it does not adequately address the issues raised in the NASD
Task Force Report concerning investors' perceptions of bias in favor of the
securities industry. 127 Because the NASD failed to implement the list
selection method recommended by the NASD Task Force in its entirety,
amended NASD Rule 10308 fails to wholly eliminate investor perception of
bias in favor of the securities industry in the NASD arbitrator selection
process. Amended NASD Rule 10308 continues to allow too much
discretion in the NASD arbitrator selection process by the securities
industry. Moreover, amended NASD Rule 10308 basically maintains the
existing arbitrator classification rules under the NASD Code and also
124 See generally Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to
the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670 (1998).
125 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,765 (1998).
126 The NASD also proposed conforming changes to Rules 10104, 10309, 10310,
10311, 10312, and 10313. See id.
127 The term "securities industry" includes both securities and commodities.
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controls those admitted to the NASD arbitrator pool. As a result, the issue
of investor perception that the NASD arbitrator selection process is biased
in favor of the securities industry remains unresolved.
The remainder of this Article will analyze factors supporting the
author's contention that amended NASD Rule 10308 does not adequately
support the NASD's goal of providing an arbitral forum that is fair to all
parties, i.e., one in which each party equally participates in the selection of
the arbitrators. First, *the minimal changes made to the arbitrator
classification system will be reviewed. Second, changes to the rules
governing the appointment of arbitrators to serve on panels will be
analyzed.
A. Arbitrator Classification Under Amended NASD Rule 10308
Under amended NASD Rule 10308, arbitrator classification in the
NASD arbitrator pool remains ineffective in avoiding even the appearance
of impropriety in the arbitrator selection process. This is because the
arbitrator classification scheme remains "largely" the same. 128 This means
that investor perception of a pro-securities industry bias in the arbitrator
selection process continues to be fueled by arbitrator classification rules
that could easily result in misclassification of arbitrators in the NASD
arbitrator pool. Like prior NASD Rule 10308, arbitrator classification rules
under amended NASD Rule 10308 are based on arbitrary assumptions that
cause the classification scheme to be under-inclusive, over-inclusive,
ambiguous, and very difficult to enforce.
Again, as under prior NASD Rule 10308, arbitrators classified as
public arbitrators in the NASD arbitrator pool under amended NASD Rule
10308 could be viewed as biased from the moment they are chosen from
the NASD arbitrator pool. However, there are some significant changes in
amended NASD Rule 10308 that seemingly exacerbate the difficulties noted
in the arbitrator classification scheme under prior NASD Rule 10308. The
remainder of this subpart will address these changes and their impact on
investor perception of a pro-securities industry bias in the NASD arbitrator
selection process.
Amended NASD Rule 10308 continues to use arbitrary time
designations to determine whether an individual is biased in favor of the
securities industry and therefore should be classified as a securities
128 Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,673.
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industry 129 arbitrator rather than a public arbitrator. However, amended
NASD Rule 10308 now includes individuals employed in the commodities
industry within its arbitrary three year rule distinguishing public and
securities industry arbitrators. Specifically, amended NASD Rule 10308
now arbitrarily assumes that individuals formerly associated with the
securities or commodities industry are perceived by public customers as no
longer biased in favor of the securities industry130 three years after being so
associated. Unlike prior NASD Rule 10308, amended NASD Rule 10308
no longer arbitrarily assumes that individuals who engage in commodities
transactions cease to be biased in favor of the securities industry the
moment they discontinue registration under the CEA or membership with a
registered futures association or commodities exchange. Under section
(a)(4) of amended NASD Rule 10308:
The term "non-public arbitrator" [securities industry arbitrator]
means a person who is otherwise qualified to serve as an arbitrator and:
(A) is, or within the past three years was:
(i) associated with a broker or a dealer (including a government
securities broker or dealer or municipal securities dealer);
(ii) registered under the Commodity Exchange Act;
(iii) a member of a commodities exchange or a registered futures
association; or
(iv) associated with a person or firm registered under the
Commodity Exchange Act;
(B) is retired from engaging in any of the business activities listed in
subparagraph (4)(A);
(C) is an attorney, accountant, or other professional who has devoted
20 percent or more of his or her professional work, in the last two years,
to clients who are engaged in any of the business activities listed in
subparagraph (4)(A); or
(D) is an employee of a bank or other financial institution and effects
transactions in securities, including government or municipal securities,
and commodities futures or options or supervises or monitors the
129 Amended NASD Rule 10308 uses the term "non-public arbitrator" to describe
securities industry arbitrators. See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule
10308(a)(4) (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting
Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in
Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
130 The term "securities industry" is used to refer to persons effecting transactions
in commodities and other securities throughout this Article.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
compliance with the securities and commodities laws of employees who
engage in such activities. 131
Although amended NASD Rule 10308 does away with the unsupported,
arbitrary assumption that persons engaged in commodities transactions are
no longer biased in favor of the securities industry the moment they cease
to engage in such transactions, it elevates another group of securities
professionals to this lofty status. Paragraph (a)(4)(D) of amended NASD
Rule 10308 specifically excludes employees of banks or other financial
institutions who are engaged in securities and commodities transactions and
supervisors of such persons from the NASD public arbitrator pool.
However, such individuals may be classified as public arbitrators in the
NASD arbitrator pool the moment they cease to be employed, to effect
securities and commodities transactions, or to supervise persons effecting
such transactions. This means that a person who has spent her entire career
in the securities industry may be classified as a public arbitrator in the
NASD arbitrator pool. In addition, amended NASD Rule 10308 continues
to assume that professionals (attorneys, accountants, and such) representing
securities industry clients require less time than persons associated with
brokers or dealers to eliminate any bias they might harbor in favor of the
securities industry; professionals require only two years to eliminate any
bias they might harbor in favor of the securities industry, while those
employed in the securities industry require three years.
Like its predecessor, amended NASD Rule 10308 fails to provide a
basis for the use of arbitrary time designations to determine whether bias in
favor of the securities industry no longer exists. As previously noted under
prior NASD Rule 10308, the use of such arbitrary time designations in the
classification of arbitrators may result in the same person being classified as
a securities industry arbitrator one year and as a public arbitrator the next
year. Seemingly, this would not alleviate investor concern that the NASD
public arbitrator pool includes individuals affiliated with the securities
industry. Moreover, such an affiliation could reasonably support investor
perception that the NASD arbitrator selection process continues to be
biased in favor of the securities industry.
The failure to define the key term "retire" in the definition of securities
industry arbitrator in amended NASD Rule 10308 also makes it subject to
131 NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(a)(4) (National Ass'n of
See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
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the same difficulties as prior NASD Rule 10308-ambiguity, under-
inclusiveness, and over-inclusiveness. Failure to define the term "retire"
may both include in the NASD public arbitrator pool individuals reasonably
perceived as biased in favor of the securities industry and exclude from the
NASD public arbitrator pool individuals reasonably perceived as not biased
in favor of the securities industry. For example, if the term "retire" is
assumed to require certain age or length of service requirements, a person
who had worked twenty years in the securities industry, did not "retire"
from the securities industry, and subsequently worked outside the securities
industry for just over three years could be classified as a public arbitrator.
On the other hand, a person "retired" from the securities industry could be
forever classified as a securities industry arbitrator, even though employed
for just over three years in a job representing the interests of investors,
e.g., working at the Commission. These types of arbitrary results
undermine the credibility of the NASD public arbitrator pool. In addition,
under amended NASD Rule 10308, this particular ambiguity now embraces
individuals registered under the CEA, members of commodities exchanges
or registered futures associations, and associated persons or firms
registered under the CEA. 132
Amended NASD Rule 10308 interjects more ambiguity into the NASD
arbitrator classification scheme by failing to define the phrase "a person
who is otherwise qualified to serve as an arbitrator" in the text of its
definitions of public and securities industry arbitrators. 133 Explanations
provided by the NASD in its Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory
Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change (Commentary) fail to provide
sufficient clarification. According to the Commentary, a qualified securities
industry arbitrator "must have the professional securities experience (or the
related qualifications) listed in subparagraph (a)(4)" of amended NASD
Rule 10308.134 This means that a person is qualified to be a securities
132 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(a)(4)(A)(ii)-(iv)
(National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
133 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rules 10308(a)(4)-(a)(5)
(National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
134 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,767 (1998); see also Order Granting Approval to
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industry arbitrator if she has worked in the securities industry for at least
three years or is retired from the securities industry; is an attorney,
accountant, or other professional who represented securities industry
clients, within the last two years, more than twenty percent of the time; or
is employed at a bank or other financial institution and effects securities
transactions or supervises persons who effect securities transactions.
Despite this "clarification," it is unclear how the securities industry
arbitrator must be "otherwise qualified." As currently written, this
qualification, in the context of the definition of securities industry
arbitrator, seems, at best, redundant.
In addition, if the NASD is attempting to ensure that those serving as
securities industry arbitrators have the requisite experience and knowledge
to do so, it does not effectively achieve this objective with respect to bank
or other financial institution employees. The moment a person begins to
work at a bank or other financial institution and to effect transactions in
securities or commodities or supervises such persons, she would be
qualified to serve as a securities industry arbitrator. It is difficult to
comprehend how such a bank employee is "qualified," i.e., has the
requisite securities or commodities experience that the NASD seems to
assert is necessary to serve as a securities industry arbitrator. It is also
questionable whether three years is sufficient to gain the requisite securities
industry experience and knowledge.
More importantly, the phrase "a person who is otherwise qualified to
serve as an arbitrator" is even more unclear, if that is possible, when used
in the definition of "public arbitrator" in amended NASD Rule 10308.
Section (a)(5) of amended NASD Rule 10308 states that:
(A) The term "public arbitrator" means a person who is otherwise
qualified to serve as an arbitrator and is not:
(i) engaged in the conduct or activities described in paragraphs
(a)(4)(A) through (D); or
(ii) the spouse or an immediate family member of a person who
is engaged in the conduct or activities described in paragraphs (a)(4)(A)
through (D).
(B) For the purpose of this rule, the term "immediate family
member" means:
(i) a family member who shares a home with a person engaged in
the conduct or activities described in paragraphs (a)(4)(A) through (D);
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,673 n.l1.
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(ii) a person who receives financial support of more than 50
percent of his or her annual income from a person engaged in, the conduct
or activities described in paragraphs (a)(4)(A) through (D); or
(iii) a person who is claimed as a dependent for federal income
tax purposes by a person engaged in the conduct oractivities described in
paragraphs (a)(4)(A) through (D). 135
According to the Commentary, "'[p]ublic arbitrator' generally means a
person who is otherwise qualified to serve as an arbitrator and is not
engaged in the conduct of, or business activities that indicate an affiliation
with, the securities industry or the related industries." 136 This means that a
person will not be classified as a public arbitrator in the NASD arbitrator
pool if that person:
(a) is currently employed in the securities or commodities industry or
a person retired from such business activities;
(b) is a professional who devotes twenty (20) percent or more of his
or her time to securities industry clients; or
(c) is an employee of a bank or other financial institution who is
engaged in securities activities or in the supervision of such activities. 37
The definition of the term "public arbitrator" in amended NASD Rule
10308(a)(5) apparently allows persons clearly affiliated with the securities
industry to be included in the NASD public arbitrator pool. Based on the
definition of the term "public arbitrator" in amended NASD Rule
10308(a)(5) and the explanation in the Commentary, it seems that one is
only "qualified" to be a public arbitrator if somehow formerly affiliated
with the securities industry but sufficiently removed from the securities
industry 138 to cease being biased in favor of the securities industry. This
135 NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(a)(5) (National Ass'n of
See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating
to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 40,761-62.
136 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,766.
137 Id. The NASD's explanation fails to note that persons who have ceased to be
associated with a broker, dealer, or commodities firm within the last three years cannot
be classified as public arbitrators.
138 This means three years if formerly associated with a broker, dealer, or a firm
or person registered under the CEA, two years if a professional representing securities
industry clients less than twenty percent of the time, and immediately if no longer
employed by a bank or other financial institution.
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would seem to make the public arbitrator pool even more suspect.
Apparently, individuals are only qualified to be public arbitrators if, at
some point in their careers, they were somehow affiliated with the
securities industry. The ambiguity engendered by the use of the phrase "a
person who is otherwise qualified to serve as an arbitrator" when defining
the term "public arbitrator" in amended NASD Rule 10308(a)(5) seems to
confirm the perception by investors that the NASD public arbitrator pool
includes arbitrators affiliated with the securities industry and therefore may
be perceived as biased in favor of the securities industry.
The classification rules of amended NASD Rule 10308, concerning
spouses and family members of persons affiliated with the securities
industry, now adequately support the underlying principle that all
arbitrators, both public and securities industry, must be neutral with no
affiliation or bias toward either party. Amended NASD Rule
10308(a)(5)(B) appropriately prohibits spouses and other household
members of persons affiliated with the securities industry from serving as
either public or securities industry arbitrators. 139 Under prior NASD Rule
10308(d), spouses and household members could serve as securities
industry arbitrators. 140
Specifically, amended NASD Rule 10308(a)(5) precludes spouses and
immediate family members of current or retired members of the securities
industry or a person engaged in any of the other types of business activities
that require classification as a securities industry arbitrator from serving as
public or securities industry arbitrators.141  Amended NASD Rule
10308(a)(5)(B) defines the term "immediate family member" as follows:
(i) a family member who shares a home with a person engaged in the
conduct or activities [of a member of the securities industry or that require
classification as a securities industry arbitrator];
(ii) a person who receives financial support of more than 50 percent
of his or her annual income from a person engaged in the conduct or
activities [of a member of the securities industry or that require
classification as a securities industry arbitrator]; or
139 See NASD CODE OF ARBrRATION PROCEDuRE Rules 10308(a)(5)(A)(ii)-
(a)(5)(B) (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,762.
140 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(d) (National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).
141 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,766.
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(iii) a person who is claimed as a dependent for federal income tax
purposes by a person engaged in the conduct or activities [of a member of.
the securities industry or that require classification as a securities industry
arbitrator]. 142
According to the NASD, the term "immediate family member" used in
amended NASD Rule 10308(a)(5)(B) was expanded to preclude such people
from being included in the public and the securities industry arbitrator
pools because "such persons' economic interests are too closely tied to
those of the securities or commodities industry, even though such spouses
and immediate family members may not be directly involved in the relevant
business activities."143 Moreover, the NASD stated that "[a] person who
has a close familial, personal, or economically dependent relationship with
an associated person may be viewed as possessing a bias in favor of the
securities or commodities industry."'144 This is a crucial observation.
Based on the NASD's observation, the logical corollary would be that
the NASD's entire arbitrator selection process, along with its arbitral
forum, would reasonably be viewed by investors as biased in favor of the
securities industry. The NASD is a member association and is funded by
the dues paid by its members, 145 i.e., firms engaged in the securities
business. These firms employ associated persons, i.e., individuals
employed in the securities industry. As noted previously, in order to open a
securities brokerage account with a member of the securities industry,
investors must sign an agreement that requires them to bring any claims
142 NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(a)(5)(B)(i)-(iii)
(National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,673
n.10 (1998); Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,762.
143 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,766-67
(emphasis added); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating
to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 56,673.
144 Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,673
(emphasis added).
145 The NASD's membership "includes virtually every broker or dealer in" the
United States. NATIONAL Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., supra note 7, at 151, 1101
(setting forth Schedule A to the NASD By-Laws).
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against members of the securities industry in securities industry sponsored
arbitral forums, e.g., the NASD arbitral forum. These forums are funded
and administered by members of the securities industry, the very members
against whom claims are brought by investors. Therefore, investors are
required to bring claims against securities industry members in an arbitral
forum which is economically dependent on, and has a close relationship
with, the securities industry. Accordingly, the entire arbitration process,
especially the arbitrator selection method, conducted under the auspices of
the NASD is rightly viewed by investors as biased in favor of the securities
industry.
Amended NASD Rule 10308, like its predecessor, is under-inclusive
because it fails to expressly include investment advisers and members of the
securities industry in its definition of securities industry arbitrator. This
means that persons who clearly would be viewed by investors as affiliated
with the securities industry continue to be classified as public arbitrators in
the NASD arbitrator pool. 146 Amended NASD Rule 10308 only classifies
investment advisers as securities industry arbitrators in its arbitrator pool if
they are employed by banks or other financial institutions and effect
securities and commodities transactions or supervise such employees.
However, these individuals would not be classified as securities industry
arbitrators under amended NASD Rule 10308 if they did not effect
securities or commodities transactions, i.e., did not purchase or sell
securities and commodities or supervise individuals who buy or sell
securities or commodities. Investment advisers who only advise their
clients, but do not purchase or sell securities for their clients, would be
classified as public arbitrators. In addition, it is unclear from the text of
subsection (a)(4)(D) of amended NASD Rule 10308, whether the phrase
"or other financial institution" would include investment advisers employed
by investment companies, insurance companies, or others entities,
excluding banks, that employ investment advisers. As a result, like its
predecessor, amended NASD Rule 10308 would allow these securities
professionals to be classified as public arbitrators in the NASD arbitrator
pool. In this instance, amended NASD Rule 10308 fails to effectively
address investor concerns of arbitrator bias because it permits persons
146 The Uniform Code and NYSE Rule 607 exclude investment advisers from their
public arbitrator pools and classify these securities professionals as industry arbitrators.
See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock Exchange,
Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,146 (1989).
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clearly affiliated with the securities industry to be included in the NASD
public arbitrator pool.
Amended NASD Rule 10308 continues to classify professionals as
public arbitrators while leaving their firms free to represent securities
industry clients with 'impunity. 147 As previously noted, economic ties
between partners may give rise to an appearance of bias that should
exclude such persons from the public arbitrator pool. 148 Economic ties have
been recognized as a particularly powerful form of biasing influence. 149
Moreover, even the NASD acknowledged that such economically
dependent relationships may give rise to an appearance of bias in favor of
the securities industry. 150 Failure to exclude professionals whose firms or
partners devote a significant amount of their work effort and derive -the
greatest source of consistent income from the securities industry would
seemingly exacerbate investor concern of the pervasiveness of bias in favor
of the securities industry in the NASD arbitrator selection process.
In summary, the arbitrator classification rules under amended NASD
Rule 10308, like its predecessor, are fatally flawed. Except as noted in the
preceding analysis, arbitrator classification rules under amended NASD
Rule 10308 are also based on arbitrary assumptions and certain key-terms
remain either ambiguous or undefined. For example, the key terms of
public and securities industry arbitrators continue to be defined in a manner
that fails to assure investors that individuals reasonably perceived as closely
affiliated with the securities industry are excluded from the NASD public
arbitrator pool.
Again, the author concedes that arbitrary assumptions and ambiguity
are probably unavoidable when attempting to classify individuals as either
public or securities industry arbitrators. However, it is instructive to note
147 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(a)(4)(C) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
148 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute
Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,146.
149 See Allison, supra note 70, at 514.
150 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,766-67 (1998); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,673
(1998).
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that investor perception of bias in favor of the securities industry in the
arbitrator selection process is not an issue in the AAA arbitral forum. This
is significant because, as previously noted, arbitrator classification rules
under the AAA Code contain equally arbitrary assumptions and ambiguous
key terms. Accordingly, investor perception that the AAA arbitrator
selection process is not biased in favor of the securities industry is likely
not based on the conciseness and clarity of the AAA Code arbitrator
classification rules. This perceived lack of bias in favor of the securities
industry is likely based on the fact that the AAA is independent from the
securities industry. As previously noted, one of the basic principals in
qualifying arbitrators is "that no single entity should establish qualifications
for all [arbitrators] in all settings." 151
Under amended NASD Rule 10308, the NASD, a securities industry
association, continues to be the sole arbiter of who is admitted to the
arbitrator pool and whether those admitted in the pool are classified as
public or securities industry arbitrators. Moreover, the standards governing
admittance to the NASD arbitrator pool remain a mystery. This set of
circumstances, in the author's opinion, unavoidably fuels the perception of
investors and their counsel that the NASD arbitrator selection process is
biased in favor of the securities industry. In fact, counsel for investors are
already concerned that the NASD presently will try to slant the whole
arbitrator pool with a bias towards the securities industry and that even if
the NASD's justifications for precluding arbitrators from its arbitrator pool
seem reasonable on their face, they could give rise to similar unacceptable
consequences. 152 This "result" is a pro-securities industry bias in the
arbitrator selection process achieved through composition and classification
of the NASD arbitrator pool. It seems that when arbitrators are admitted to
a pool of arbitrators selected and classified by a securities industry
association such as the NASD, individuals admitted to such an entity's
arbitrator pool may be perceived as biased in favor of the securities
industry no matter how the classification rules are crafted.
Again, the author strongly suggests that the only effective way to
eliminate investor perception of pro-securities industry bias in the NASD
arbitrator classification process is to remove the arbitrator selection process
from the NASD arbitral forum to an arbitral forum that is independent from
the securities industry. Moreover, given securities industry domination and
151 SPIDR COMM'N ON QUALIFICATIONS, SOCIETY OF PROF'LS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 95, at 1.
152 See generally Scott Bernstein, NASD "Streamlining" of the Arbitrator Pool,
PIABA Q., Dec. 1998, at 17.
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control of the composition and classification of the NASD arbitrator pool, it
is likely that even the implementation of the new list selection method under
amended NASD Rule 10308 will fail to eradicate the perception of
investors and their counsel that the NASD arbitrator selection process is
biased in favor of the securities industry.
B. Appointing Arbitrators Under Amended NASD Rule 10308
The new list selection method and rotational selection rule prescribed in
amended NASD Rule 10308 attempts to ensure selection of arbitrators by
the parties rather than the NASD staff, i.e., the securities industry.
Essentially, the goal appears to be the elimination of the enormous
discretion previously exercised by NASD staff in the NASD arbitrator
selection process. Under amended NASD Rule 10308, parties are provided
lists of potential arbitrators (both public and securities industry arbitrators)
from the NASD arbitrator pool and use these lists to express numerical
preferences or rankings for the arbitrators on the lists in sequential order.
These rankings are the basis upon which arbitrators are appointed to serve
on a panel, "unless all ranked arbitrators decline to serve because they are
unavailable, recuse themselves, or are disqualified because of conflicts of
interest." 153 The lists of arbitrators forwarded to the parties are generated
from an arbitrator database using a software program, the Neutral List
Selection System (NLSS),154 on a rotational basis.
The list selection method implemented by the NASD consists of one
round rather than the three rounds recommended by the NASD Task
Force.155 The NASD states that there is an insufficient number of
arbitrators in its arbitrator pool, given its large caseload, to implement a
three-round list selection method.156 The NASD asserts that even
153 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,765; see
also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,672.
154 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(4) (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,765.
155 See ARBrrAnTON POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 94-96.
156 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,765. As
previously noted, the NASD's caseload is large because, in many cases, the predispute
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implementing a two-round list selection method would be too costly and
"would make the process of appointing arbitrators too lengthy."'1 57
In summary, paragraphs (b) through (d) of amended NASD Rule 10308
provide for the composition of arbitrator panels, a list selection method to
choose arbitrators to serve on arbitration panels, selection of arbitrators on
the lists from the NASD arbitrator pool on a rotational basis, and a ranking
process to reflect the preferences of the parties in selecting arbitrators to
serve on NASD arbitration panels.
1. Composition of Panels
Under amended NASD Rule 10308, the number and type of arbitrators
appointed to serve in cases involving disputes with investors remain
basically unchanged and are based on the amount of the claim. For claims
of $50,000 or less, one public arbitrator is appointed to serve on a panel. 158
For claims exceeding $50,000, three arbitrators are appointed to serve on a
panel, and the majority must be public arbitrators. 159 If the amount of the
claim is greater than $25,000 but less than $50,000, a party or an arbitrator
may request a panel of three arbitrators composed of a majority of public
arbitrators. 160 If the amount of the claim is $25,000 or less, only an
arbitrator appointed to the case may request the appointment of a panel of
three arbitrators composed of a majority of public arbitrators. 161 All panel
compositions specified in amended NASD Rule 10308(b) may vary if both
resolution agreement requires investors to arbitrate at the NASD.
157 Id.
158 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(1)(A) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
159 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATON PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(1)(B) (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
160 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
161 See NASD CODE OF ARBrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(1)(A)(i)
(National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
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parties agree.
2. Placement of Arbitrators on Lists
NLSS maintains a database of the NASD arbitrator pool, which
identifies arbitrators in the pool as public or securities industry. Based on
the information contained in its database, NLSS generates lists sent to the
parties for ranking. 162 NLSS uses four factors to generate the lists of
arbitrators provided to the parties for ranking. These four factors are as
follows: arbitrator classification, hearing location code, rotation, and
identified conflicts of interest.163 To generate a list, NLSS does the
following: (1) identifies arbitrators in its database by classification, i.e., as
either public or industry arbitrators; (2) "identifies those arbitrators in the
same hearing location as the arbitration"; (3) selects the public or industry
arbitrators "who are located in the hearing location in rotation" from its
database; and (4) excludes arbitrators "subject to a conflict of interest with
one of the parties."164
NLSS sorts its database on a "first-in-first-out" basis in order to place
arbitrators on the lists on a rotating basis. 165 For example, to generate a
162 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,765 (1998); see also NASD CoD OF ARBITRATiON
PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(4) (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); Order
Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in
Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
163 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,768.
Pursuant to paragraph (a)(4) of amended NASD Rule 10308, parties may also request
that the computer sort for arbitrators with expertise in subject matter and type of
security. There are 22 security subcategories. However, the Director of Arbitration is
not obligated to provide arbitrators on the list with the requested expertise because they
might be unavailable, excluded because of conflicts or because NLSS may not be coded
for that particular subject matter. The Director of Arbitration or both parties may also
request a sort by case expertise, i.e., those arbitrators with expertise in large and
complex cases. In addition, "[a]t the request of a party, the Director [of Arbitration]
can add a procedure that is outside the NLSS capability, but that may legitimately be
considered in the selection of an arbitration panel." Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,681 n.90.
164 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,768.
165 Id. at 40,768 n.29; see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
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one-person public arbitrator panel, as the public arbitrator's name rises to
the top of the list in a particular hearing location, the arbitrator's name will
be put on a list to be sent to the parties, absent a conflict of interest with
one of the parties. After the arbitrator's name is sent to parties on a list, the
arbitrator's name is placed at the bottom of NLSS's database. 166 An
arbitrator's name is placed on the bottom of the NLSS database even if she
is recused, is not ranked highly enough by the parties to serve, is struck by
the parties, or is ranked highly enough to serve but is unavailable to
serve. 167 For a three-person panel requiring two public arbitrators and one
securities industry arbitrator, the list forwarded to the parties for ranking
would be generated in the same manner. When generating the list of
securities industry arbitrators, the names of the first five securities industry
arbitrators in the designated hearing location on the NLSS database would
be selected or "rotated forward" 168 for placement on the list to be
forwarded to the parties for ranking.' 69 Prior to forwarding this list to the
parties, arbitrators on the list next would be reviewed for possible conflicts
of interest.
[Flor example, [if] the case is against Firm X and the first person that
NLSS generates, Arbitrator A51000, is employed by Firm X, NLSS will
not select Arbitrator A51000 but will skip over [him] or her and will list
the next person classified as a [securities industry] arbitrator. Arbitrator
A51000 will remain at the top of the internal NLSS rotating list for
[securities industry] arbitrators, and the NLSS will generate his or her
name when next requested to produce the names of [securities industry]
arbitrators for a case in the same hearing location. 170
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,674 n.22.
166 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,768 n.29.
167 See id.
168 Id.
169 It should be noted that for a one-person panel, NLSS can only generate a list
for either public or securities industry arbitrators. For a three-person panel, NLSS can
only generate lists for a panel composed of one securities industry arbitrator and two
public arbitrators or three securities industry arbitrators. See Order Granting Approval
to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations
Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,673.
170 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,768 n.29.
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Neither the text of amended NASD Rule 10308 nor its Commentary
fully describes the types of conflict of interests identified by NLSS.
According to the NASD, the NLSS can only select or sort.for "a clear
conflict of interest with one of the parties,"' 171 i.e., "only obvious,
disclosed conflicts of interest."172 The NASD identifies two of these "clear
conflicts of interest" as cases in which the respondent is the employer of an
arbitrator 173 or has a securities account with the respondent; 174 in such
cases, NLSS would not place the arbitrator on the list it generates that is
forwarded to the parties for ranking. 175
It is essential that public customers, and their counsel, understand
precisely the types of conflicts of interest identified by NLSS in its sorting
or selection process. Failure to adequately describe the types of conflicts of
interest identified in the sorting process may only fuel investor perception
that the arbitrator selection process remains biased in favor of the securities
industry. Information currently provided in amended NASD Rule 10308
and its Commentary is woefully inadequate.
The NASD also attempts in amended NASD Rule 10308 to ensure that
arbitrators are placed on the lists forwarded to parties for ranking with the
same regularity, 176 i.e., to prevent some arbitrators from being placed on
lists forwarded to the parties for ranking more frequently than others.
Specifically, NLSS assigns the arbitrator who has taken part in the fewest
list selection processes a higher rotation number than an arbitrator who has
participated in more list selection processes. This means, for example, that
a public arbitrator from Atlanta, Georgia who has participated in the list
selection process five times would be listed before a public arbitrator from
Atlanta, Georgia who had participated seven times in the selection process
if both were generated for the same list. 177
171 Id. at 40,768.
172 Id. at 40,768 n.30.
173 Id.
174 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at
56,680 n.76.
175 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,768 n.30.
176 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at
56,681.
177 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,768 n.29.
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The rotational rule implemented under amended NASD Rule 10308
substantially conforms with the NASD Task Force's recommendation that
arbitrators be placed on lists forwarded to the parties on a rotating basis.
According to the NASD Task Force, "the NASD should attempt to offer
qualified arbitrators as candidates on a rotating basis" and "should monitor
the frequency with which individual arbitrators are listed and selected." 178
Amended NASD Rule 10308's rotational selection rule aids in eliminating
investor perception that the NASD arbitrator selection process under prior
NASD Rule 10308 allowed repeated selection of arbitrators whose
decisions seemed to favor the securities industry.179
Using a software program to generate the list of arbitrators rather than
relying solely on NASD staff judgment helps to lessen the perception of
bias in favor of the securities industry in the arbitrator selection process.
Selecting arbitrators in rotation would seemingly reduce NASD staff
discretion in placing arbitrators on the lists forwarded to the parties for
ranking. However, NASD staff180 discretion has been interposed in
amended NASD Rule 10308's rotational rule when determining whether to
place an arbitrator on the list because of conflicts of interest. NASD staff
performs a manual review for conflicts of interest before the lists are sent
to the parties. This manual review consists of, among other things,
reviewing information found in the Central Registration Depository
(CRD) 181 (only for securities industry arbitrators) and information disclosed
by arbitrators to NASD staff. NASD staff does not contact the arbitrators
on the list generated by NLSS during its manual review. Most importantly,
NASD staff may remove an arbitrator from the list as a result of its manual
178 ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 97.
179 See PIABA, supra note 1, at 10-11. The author notes that the NASD Task
Force made this recommendation to "promote more frequent selection of arbitrators
who complete the arbitrator training programs." ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE,
supra note 1, at 97. Currently all new arbitrators are required to complete an arbitrator
training seminar and to successfully complete a test on the materials covered in the
training seminar before serving as an arbitrator in any arbitration proceeding.
180 The author recognizes that NASD staff referred to in this Article would be
employees of NASDR, the NASD subsidiary to which the NASD has delegated the
responsibility of administering its arbitral forum.
181 The CRD is an online registration and licensing data bank and an application-
processing facility. It maintains the qualification, employment, and disclosure
(including disciplinary history) of the more than half a million registered securities
employees of NASD member firms. See Central Registration Depository, Central
Registration Depository (CRD) System (last modified Oct. 14, 1999)
< http://www.nasdr.com/3400.htm >.
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review before the lists are forwarded to the parties for ranking. During the
review, NASD staff determines, in its sole discretion, whether to remove
arbitrators from the list generated by NLSS even though NLSS was
designed to reduce, if not eliminate, NASD staff discretion in the arbitrator
selection process. Although amended NASD Rule 10308 does not contain
an express standard for determining conflicts of interest requiring
disqualification, 182 the NASD asserts that "[a]ny time that a Director [of
Arbitration] must resolve a disqualification issue, the Director [of
Arbitration] will refer to" the applicable provisions of The Arbitrator's
Manual and Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.183
However, these documents contain general prescriptions and allow, if not
require, the exercise of discretion by the Director of Arbitration in their
application. Accordingly, the manual review performed by NASD staff
injects, unnecessarily, NASD staff judgment back into the arbitrator
selection process.
Moreover, to successfully eliminate perceived pro-securities industry
bias, this type of review probably should be conducted only by the parties.
The Director of Arbitration under current NASD Rule 10312(e) is required
to disclose to all parties information disclosed by arbitrators to the Director
of Arbitration relating to financial interests or relationships which might
preclude the arbitrator from rendering a fair and impartial decision, unless
the arbitrator voluntarily withdraws'8 4 or the Director of Arbitration
determines to remove him or her;185 this presumably would include
information obtained from the CRD as well as information obtained from
any other source. If the arbitrator decides not to withdraw, this information
should be given to the parties so that they, rather than NASD staff, are
given the opportunity to identify conflicts of interest based on information
obtained by NASD staff in its manual review. If a party identifies a conflict
of interest based on such information, the party's remedy is to strike the
person from the list. Use of discretion or judgment by NASD staff would
most likely be viewed, at least by investors, as another instance of
182 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchnge Act
Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,680 (1998).
183 See THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 5-6, 42-44; see also supra
note 104 (setting forth the same standards for conflicts of interests).
184 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at
56,672, 56,677 n.45.
185 See id. at 56,677.
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securities industry domination and control, resulting in an arbitrator
selection process biased in favor of the securities industry.
Neither the text of amended NASD Rule 10308 nor its Commentary
states how arbitrators currently in the NASD arbitrator pool or
subsequently added to the NASD arbitrator pool would be initially ranked
or positioned in the NLSS database, i.e., prior to being placed on a list
forwarded to the parties for ranking. Specifically, it is unclear how
arbitrators currently in the NASD arbitrator pool would be initially
positioned in the NLSS database or how arbitrators subsequently added to
the NASD arbitrator pool would be positioned or ranked relative to those
already in the pool. The Commentary only addresses the operation of the
NLSS selection process after arbitrators in the NASD pool of arbitrators
have initially been assigned positions in the NLSS database. 186 It is
essential that the initial positioning of arbitrators in the NLSS database be
perceived by investors as fair and unbiased. The Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA), in its filing with the Commission,
has appropriately recognized this issue and suggests that arbitrators initially
should be positioned in the database on a random basis and assigned a
permanent number; arbitrators subsequently added to the pool then would
be assigned the next available number. 187 After being positioned in the
NLSS database on a random basis, arbitrators then could be placed on lists
forwarded to the parties for ranking on a rotating basis. Whatever the
method adopted for initially positioning arbitrators in the NLSS database, it
must be free from even the appearance of impropriety; if not, it will be yet
another instance in which public customers can reasonably perceive that the
arbitrator selection process is biased in favor of the securities industry. In
fact, attorneys representing investors assert that the NASD is currently
engaged in a "streamlining" of its existing arbitrator pool; specifically, they
assert that the NASD is eliminating some of the arbitrators in its arbitrator
pool who have provided services to investors with claims against members
186 The NASD states that arbitrators are assigned an identification number in the
NLSS database as they "enter the system"; it does not indicate whether the arbitrator
identification number coincides with the arbitrator's position or ranking in the NLSS
database. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,771 n.46 (1998). The NASD Task Force also failed
to address this issue. In its report, it failed to specify how to implement its
recommendation of the use of a rotational selection rule.
187 See PIABA, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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of the securities industry.188
3. Party Ranking of Arbitrators
The parties receive and must rank arbitrators on lists generated by
NLSS. The Director of Arbitration sends lists generated by NLSS from the
NASD arbitrator pool, and manually reviewed by NASD staff, to the
parties. Only one list of public arbitrators is sent to all the parties for a
panel of one arbitrator, unless the parties agree to a different panel
composition. 189 Two lists, one containing public arbitrators and one
containing securities industry arbitrators, are sent to the parties for a panel
of three arbitrators. 19° For a panel of three arbitrators, the lists must
contain, "to the extent possible," the names of public and securities
industry arbitrators in a two-to-one ratio, respectively.19 ' For example, if
the securities industry arbitrator list contained five names, the public
arbitrator list would contain ten names. However, if the available roster of
arbitrators is insufficient, the Director of Arbitration would send a list of
public arbitrators containing not less than six names and a securities
industry arbitrator list containing not less than three names. 192
The composition of lists sent to parties for ranking under amended
NASD Rule 10308 differs from the NASD Task Force's recommendation
in that parties would receive three lists of arbitrators instead of two lists of
arbitrators for a panel of three arbitrators. Under the NASD Task Force
recommendation, parties would receive the. following three lists of
candidates: "(i) a list of public arbitrators qualified to be panel chairs to
contain no fewer than three names; (ii) a list of other public arbitrators, to
contain no fewer than five names; and (iii) a list of securities industry
188 See generally Bernstein, supra note 152.
189 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(2) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,762.
190 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(3) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,762.
191 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,761.
192 See id.
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arbitrators, to contain no fewer than five names." 193 The NASD Task
Force recommends two lists or categories of public arbitrators because it
believes that at least one of the public arbitrators, the chairperson of the
arbitration panel, must have a "strong command of NASD arbitration
procedure and general arbitration techniques, as well as familiarity with
industry practices and substantive law." 194 However, the author suggests
that two list categories consisting of public arbitrators and securities
industry arbitrators most likely are sufficient; three list categories might
unnecessarily prolong the selection process, thus undermining the efficiency
and speed of the arbitration process. 195
Under amended NASD Rule 10308, the lists of arbitrators are sent196
"to all parties at the same time[,] approximately thirty days after the last
answer is due." 197 The parties must be provided with the employment
history of arbitrators on the list for the past ten years and "other
background information. " 198
Parties may strike one or all the arbitrators on the list for any reason
and are required to rank any names remaining on the lists by assigning a
different numerical, sequential ranking to each arbitrator. 199 The numeral
193 ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 95.
19 4 Id. at 111.
195 The NASD Task Force's recommendation as to the qualifications of a panel
chairperson seems designed to address the quality of arbitrators and not the impartiality
of the arbitrator selection process, which is at issue in this Article.
196 "Send" means to send by first class mail, facsimile, or any other method
available and convenient to the parties and the Director of Arbitration. See NASD
CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(a)(7) (National Ass'n of See. Dealers,
Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection
of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,762.
197 NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(5) (National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,762. Generally, the answer is due within 20 days from the receipt of
the statement of claim. See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule
10314(b)(1) (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
198 NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(6) (National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,671
(1998). The text of NASD Rule 10308(b)(6) does not define the phrase "other
background information." Accordingly, it is unclear what type of other background
information must be provided to the parties.
199 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(1) (National
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
ARBITRATOR SELECTION AT THE NASD
"one" indicates a party's first choice. 200 The parties must return the lists
ranking the arbitrators no later than twenty days after the Director of
Arbitration sends the lists to the parties, unless the Director of Arbitration
extends this period.201 If any party fails to return the lists within twenty
days, the Director of Arbitration will assume that the party accepted all the
arbitrators on the lists and has no preferences.2 02 However, if a party fails
to rank an arbitrator on the list, "the Director of Arbitration will assign the
[unranked] arbitrator the next lower ranking after the lowest-ranked
arbitrator on that list." 2 03 For example, if a party ranks arbitrators on a list
containing five securities industry arbitrators by striking two and ranking
arbitrators A and B as "one" and "two" respectively, but fails to rank
arbitrator C, the Director would assign arbitrator C a ranking of "three." 20 4
The assignment of a rank on behalf of a party by the Director of Arbitration
reasonably may be perceived by investors as permitting too much discretion
in the arbitrator selection process by a securities industry sponsored arbitral
forum. Moreover, the Director of Arbitration is required to assume that the
party intended to rank the arbitrator instead of striking the arbitrator. If a
party fails to rank two or more arbitrators on the same list or gives two or
more arbitrators on the same list the same numerical ranking, the Director
of Arbitration ranks the multiple, unranked arbitrators and the arbitrators
with the same numerical ranking in the same order of preference in which
they appeared on the original list sent to the parties. 205
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
200 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at
56,671.
201 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(2) (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, '63
Fed. Reg. at 40,763. Parties may request additional information, but the time for
returning the lists is not automatically tolled. This means that the parties' ability to
identify conflicts and to participate intelligently in the striking and ranking process may
be adversely affected because they may not have the necessary information before the
lists must be returned to the NASD.
202 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
203 Id. at 40,770.
204 See id.
205 See id.
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This procedure inappropriately treats a failure to rank multiple
arbitrators and the assignment of the same ranking to multiple arbitrators in
the same manner. It also prohibits a party from having an equal preference
for arbitrators on the list and assumes that, if a party fails to assign a
ranking for two or more arbitrators, the party has a preference and did not
intend to strike the two arbitrators. This particular procedure reasonably
may be perceived by investors as, again, a reflection of NASD staff bias
and prejudgment in the arbitrator selection process; it allows the securities
industry discretion in the ranking process of the parties by substituting the
judgment of the securities industry for the parties. A better procedure might
include contacting the parties to determine their intent or assuming that the
parties meant to strike unranked arbitrators and allowing the parties to
assign the same numerical ranking to multiple arbitrators. Because the goal
is to permit the parties, rather than NASD staff, to select the arbitrators,
striking unranked arbitrators and permitting parties to assign the same
numerical ranking to multiple arbitrators would seem to have a less adverse
impact on the choices of the parties in the ranking process, rather than
permitting the Director of Arbitration to decide that the parties would have
ranked the arbitrators on the list in a certain manner.
4. Consolidation of Party Rankings
Generally, the rankings of the parties are consolidated by the Director
of Arbitration, using NLSS, 206 into one list or two lists (if the panel will
consist of three arbitrators) reflecting the names of those arbitrators
acceptable to all parties. 20 7 The consolidation process is a one-step process
if all parties filing a single claim are treated as one claimant and all
206 The Director of Arbitration can use only NLSS in the consolidation process for
certain panel combinations. NLSS can consolidate the rankings for a one-person panel
of either public or securities industry arbitrators; for a three-person panel, NLSS can
consolidate the rankings for a panel composed of one securities industry arbitrator and
two public arbitrators or three securities industry arbitrators. See Order Granting
Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in
Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 43-40,555, 63
Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,673 (1998).
207 As previously noted, this may not be the case if one or more of the parties fails
to rank or to strike a name on the original list generated by NLSS, manually reviewed
by NASD staff, and forwarded to the parties for ranking; the Director of Arbitration
makes certain assumptions about how the parties would have ranked the arbitrators on
the list if they had not failed to rank or strike these arbitrators from the list.
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respondents filing a single answer are treated as one respondent. 20 8 It is a
two-step process if there are multiple claimants or respondents filing
multiple claims or answers, respectively, 209 but the 'Director of Arbitration
determines that the interests of all claimants or all respondents are
substantially the same.2 10 The two-step consolidation process can be
avoided if multiple claimants cooperate by submitting one ranked list to
which all claimants jointly agree, and multiple respondents cooperate by
submitting one ranked list to which all respondents jointly agree. In the
one-step consolidation process, the rankings of the claimant and the
respondent are added together, and the arbitrator with the lowest total (the
number one indicates the highest ranking by a party) is positioned first on
the consolidated list; the arbitrator with the next lowest total is positioned
second on the consolidated list and so on.
Table 1. Ranking Process
Arbitrator Original Consolidated Consolidated Consolidated
Name List Claimant Respondent Total RankPosition Ranking Ranking
R. Jones 1 1 6 7 4
S. Sampson 2 strike 7 0 0
B. White 3 2 1 3 1
L. Herbert 4 3 5 8 5
A. Hunt 5 4 2 6 3
C. Holden 6 2 3 5 2
The Director of Arbitration, using NLSS, creates a single consolidated
list of public arbitrators, and if a panel of three arbitrators is required, a
second list of securities industry arbitrators. If there is a numerical tie
between two or more arbitrators, NLSS breaks the tie first by preferentially
ranking the arbitrator that has the smallest numerical difference between the
claimant ranking and the respondent ranking. If the numerical difference is
the same, the arbitrator listed higher on the list originally generated by
NLSS, manually reviewed by NASD staff, and sent to the parties will be
208 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,770 (1998).
209 See id.
210 See id.; NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(3)(A)
(National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ranked higher on the consolidated list. 211
Table 2. Numerical Ties
Arbi- Original Consol- Consol- Consol- Diff-
trator List idated idated Total idated
Name Position Claimant Respondent Total erenceRanking Ranking
R. Hunt 1 1 6 7 1 n/a
S. Jones 2 3 5 8 3 2
P. James 3 4 4 8 2 0
A. White 4 5 3 8 4 2
C. Black 5 6 2 8 5 4
In the two-step process, first, the rankings of all claimants are added
together and the rankings of all respondents are added together;2 12 this
assumes that each claimant and each respondent submitted separate ranked
lists to the Director of Arbitration, i.e., they did not cooperate in the
ranking process. Next, the combined totals for all claimants are added to
the combined totals of all respondents, and the arbitrator with the lowest
numerical total is positioned first on the consolidated list, the arbitrator
with the next lowest numerical total is positioned second on the list, and so
on. 213 The Director of Arbitration, using NLSS, then creates a single
consolidated list of public arbitrators or two consolidated lists consisting of
public arbitrators and securities industry arbitrators (for panels with three
arbitrators only) as described in the preceding paragraph for the one-step
process.
Finally, the consolidation process makes no provision for party
participation in the arbitrator selection process if a party is added after the
consolidated lists have been prepared but before the initial hearing or
prehearing conference has occurred. Amended NASD Rule 10308 allows
an additional party to participate in the list selection process before the
Director of Arbitration has consolidated the other parties' rankings.2 14
211 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,771-72.
212 The NASD asserts that "consolidating the rankings of parties on the same
side... ensures that claimants' and respondents' choices will have the same weight in
the arbitrator selection process." Id. at 40,770.
213 See supra tbl.1.
2 14 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(6) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
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However, it makes no provision for additional parties after the parties'
rankings have been consolidated but before the initial hearing or prehearing
conference, whichever occurs first. Such parties will only be included in
the arbitrator selection process if they become a party to the proceeding
before the Director of Arbitration has consolidated the other parties'
rankings.
5. The Arbitrator Appointment Process
The Director of Arbitration appoints arbitrators to serve on arbitration
panels based on the order of rankings on the consolidated list (or two lists
for a panel requiring three arbitrators) subject to disqualification and
availability. 215 Before appointing arbitrators from the consolidated list to
serve on a panel, the Director of Arbitration must contact the arbitrators to
determine availability and whether there are conflicts of interest or bias or
any other reason that the arbitrator would not be able to serve on the
panel.216 The Director of Arbitration begins by contacting the arbitrator
ranked highest on the consolidated list. After this initial contact with the
arbitrator, only the Director of Arbitration determines whether to disqualify
the arbitrator "based upon that information the arbitrator has previously
provide[d], any information provided to the Director [of Arbitration] under
[current] Rule 10312J[217] and any information obtained from any other
source." 218 If the arbitrator is not disqualified and is available, the Director
of Arbitration would appoint the arbitrator to the panel. If the arbitrator is
disqualified or unavailable, the Director of Arbitration would contact the
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
215 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,763,
40,772; NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(4)(A) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
216 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
217 Current NASD Rule 10312 requires arbitrators to disclose information relating
to financial interests or relationships which might preclude the arbitrator from
rendering a fair and impartial decision. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,677-78
(1998).
218 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,772.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
next highest ranked arbitrator on the consolidated list and would continue to
do so until a full panel could be appointed. 219 The Director of Arbitration
allows a reasonable time frame for the arbitrator to respond to this initial
contact before contacting the next arbitrator on the consolidated list.220
Party participation in the arbitrator selection process may be
undermined under amended NASD Rule 10308 because NASD staff
discretion is exercised after the lists are consolidated but before the
arbitrators on the consolidated list are appointed to serve on a panel. It is in
the sole discretion of the Director of Arbitration whether to disqualify an
arbitrator on the consolidated list before appointing the arbitrator to serve
on a panel. In essence, the parties' selections may be expunged if the
Director of Arbitration determines that the arbitrator is disqualified based,
possibly, on information to which only the Director of Arbitration may
have access. Investors may reasonably perceive such discretion at this stage
of the arbitrator selection process as an opportunity for NASD staff to
weaken or undermine their participation in the arbitrator selection process.
It is suggested that if an arbitrator is available to serve on an arbitration
panel, parties should be given all the information obtained by the Director
of Arbitration when contacting the arbitrators. Based on this additional
information, parties should be allowed to make the initial determination as
to whether a conflict of interest or bias exists which would preclude the
arbitrator from rendering a fair and impartial decision. Instead, this initial
determination is made in the sole discretion of NASD staff.
If the number of arbitrators available to serve from the consolidated list
is insufficient to fill a panel, NASD staff discretion, once again, determines
which arbitrators are appointed to serve on a panel. 221 The Director of
Arbitration is permitted to appoint arbitrators not on a consolidated list if
the number of arbitrators available to serve from a consolidated list is
insufficient to complete a panel. 222 However, the parties, at this stage of the
219 See id. at 40,763.
220 See id. at 40,762. Neither the text nor the commentary of proposed Rule 10308
states this time frame; the commentary describes this time frame as "appropriate, but
relatively brief." Id. at 40,772.
221 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(4)(B) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
222 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(4)(B) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
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process, may request only that the arbitrator appointed by the Director of
Arbitration be disqualified; this request must be unanimous, in writing, and
made within fifteen days of being notified of the Director of Arbitration's
appointment. 22 3 Apparently, if the one-round list selection method fails,
parties are allowed even less participation in the arbitrator selection process
under amended NASD Rule 10308 than under its predecessor. Prior NASD
Rule 10308 allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for
cause. 224 Amended NASD Rule 10308 only allows challenges for cause.
225
Only allowing the parties to request the disqualification of an arbitrator
appointed in the sole discretion of the Director of Arbitrator does not
facilitate the goal of eliminating at least the perception of securities industry
bias in the arbitrator selection process. In contrast, AAA Rule 14 allows at
least one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause.
226
Implementation of the NASD Task Force's recommendation of a three-
round list selection method might better address the issue of failure to
obtain sufficient arbitrators to appoint a panel. 227 Under the list selection
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671. The Director of Arbitration cannot appoint a
securities industry arbitrator, unless a securities industry arbitrator is requested by the
parties. See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(4)(B) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671. In addition, the Director of Arbitration is
prohibited from appointing a securities industry arbitrator who has either retired from
the securities industry or is a professional devoting 20% or more of his work effort to
securities industry clients within the last two years. See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE Rules 10308(a)(4), 10308(c)(4)(B) (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.
1999).
223 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(b)(6) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671.
224 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308 (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999) (amended 1998).
225 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(1)(A) (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999).
226 See SEC. ARBrrRATION Rule 14 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993). Under the
AAA Code a limited number of names are also submitted to the parties and each party
is allowed to strike, on a peremptory basis, one name for each arbitrator to be
appointed. See id.
227 See AR~rrRATION PoLucY TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 111 (stating that "we
are concerned that there will not be a sufficient number of qualified chairs to meet the
needs of the NASD's expanding caseloads").
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method recommended by the NASD Task Force, each party strikes names
from any of the lists and then ranks the remaining names on each list in
order of preference. If there are an insufficient number of mutually
agreeable arbitrators to complete a panel new lists would be provided for
each category (public arbitrator or securities industry arbitrator) in which
agreement was not reached. This process would continue for no more than
three rounds.2 28 Providing the parties with three opportunities to select a
panel and allowing unlimited strikes in each round is more effective in
ensuring that the parties, rather than NASD staff, determine the arbitrators
appointed to serve on panels.
However, the NASD Task Force's recommended procedure for
selecting arbitrators, should a panel not be completed within the three
rounds, injects unacceptable NASD staff discretion into the arbitrator
selection process once again. "If, at the end of the three rounds, a
[securities] industry and two public arbitrators[2 91 ... ha[ve] not been
chosen, the Director [of Arbitration] would appoint the remaining"
arbitrator(s) who could "only be challenged for cause."2 30 Using the
procedure specified in AAA Rule 14 of submitting a short list of names per
vacancy and allowing a single peremptory challenge231 probably would be
more effective in achieving the goal of arbitrator selection by the parties
rather than by NASD staff.
In securities industry sponsored arbitration forums, it is essential to the
perceived fairness of the arbitration process itself that the arbitrator
selection process, and therefore the composition of the arbitrator panels,
reflect the choices of both parties and not the choices of one predominant
party-the securities industry. Unfortunately, this has not been achieved in
the arbitrator appointment process under amended NASD Rule 10308. If
the one-round list selection method results in an insufficient number of
arbitrators to complete a panel, the NASD, rather than the parties,
determines which arbitrators are appointed to serve on a panel.2 32
228 See id. at 95.
229 "[O]ne qualified as a panel chair." Id.
230 Id. In addition, the NASD Task Force notes that unlimited strikes are not
recommended until a panel is chosen, given the relatively small size of the NASD
arbitrator pool at the time of its report.
231 See SEC. ARBITRATION Rule 14 (American Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
232 See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the
Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,683 (1998).
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6. Selecting Chairpersons
Parties are allowed only a limited opportunity to select the chairperson
of the aibitration panel. The parties have only fifteen days to appoint a
chairperson from the date the Director of Arbitration sends notice of the
names of the arbitrators appointed to serve on the panel. 233 If the parties
cannot agree on whom to appoint as chairperson, the Director of
Arbitration appoints the chairperson of the panel. 234 Significantly, the
Director of Arbitration is prohibited from appointing as chairperson
attorneys or other professionals who have devoted fifty percent or more of
their work effort to representing investors in disputes with members of the
securities industry. Specifically, paragraph (c)(5) of amended NASD Rule
10308 states that:
(A) The Director shall appoint as the chairperson the public arbitrator
who is the most highly ranked by the parties as long as the person is not
an attorney, accountant, or other professional who has devoted [fifty
percent] or more of his or her professional or business activities, within
the last two years, to representing or advising public customers in matters
relating to disputed securities or commodities transactions or similar
matters.
(B) If the most highly ranked public arbitrator is subject to the
exclusion set forth in subparagraph (A), the Director shall appoint as the
chairperson the other public arbitrator, as long as the person also is not
subject to the exclusion set forth in subparagraph (A).
(C) If both public arbitrators are subject to the exclusion set forth in
subparagraph (A), the Director shall appoint as the chairperson the public
arbitrator who is the most highly ranked by the parties. 235
Moreover, paragraph (c)(5) of amended NASD Rule 10308 would also
233 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(5) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671-72.
2 34 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(5) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671-72.
235 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(5) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,672.
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prohibit any person employed by an attorney or other professional devoting
fifty percent or more of her work effort to the representation of investors in
disputes with members of the securities industry from serving as
chairperson.236 Such an individual could be appointed as chairperson by the
Director of Arbitration only if all public arbitrators on the panel
"devote . . [fifty percent] or more of [their] professional or business
activities, within the last two years, to representing or advising [investors]
in matters relating to disputed securities or commodities transactions or
similar matters. " 237
It seems that this rule assumes that securities industry respondents
would not be treated fairly if an attorney or other professional primarily
representing investors is appointed as chairperson of an NASD arbitration
panel. If the securities industry perceives that its members would not be
treated fairly if only the chairperson represents primarily investors in
securities disputes, surely it can concede that investors might reasonably
perceive that they too cannot be treated fairly in a securities industry
sponsored, funded, and controlled arbitral forum. Presently, the securities
industry determines who is allowed into the pool of arbitrators from which
both public and securities industry arbitrators are chosen, has some
discretion in determining which of the arbitrators are appointed to serve on
arbitration panels from this securities industry-selected pool of arbitrators,
and decides all challenges for cause to its decisions as to which arbitrators
are appointed from its pool of arbitrators. Even though amended NASD
Rule 10308 allows investor participation in the arbitrator selection process,
it seems that the NASD is attempting to reduce the impact of investor
participation by prohibiting a perceived advantage that investors might have
resulting from the appointment of chairpersons who primarily represent
investors in securities disputes.
Thus, the NASD seems to believe that "fairness" requires precluding
those who primarily represent investors in disputes with the securities
industry from serving as chairpersons. Under prior NASD Rule 10308,
there was no such prohibition, and the Director of Arbitration appointed the
chairperson without restrictions. 238 In addition, while under the prior
236 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
40,261, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,761, 40,772 (1998).
237 NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(c)(5)(B), (C); see also
Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg., at 56,671.
238 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308 (National Ass'n of
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arbitrator selection process NASD Rule 10308 provided that the Director of
Arbitration may appoint the chairperson, amended NASD Rule 10308 states
unequivocally that the Director of Arbitration shall appoint the chairperson
of the panel if the parties are unable to agree on a chairperson within a
mere fifteen days. It would seem that in order to dispel any perception of
securities industry bias or domination, such an attorney or professional
should be appointed as chairperson of the arbitration panel in a securities
industry sponsored and administered arbitral forum. Moreover, in light of
the fact that the Commission asserts that all arbitrators appointed to serve
on arbitration panels in securities industry sponsored arbitration forums,
whether classified as public or securities industry arbitrators, must be
impartial, 239 this provision of amended NASD Rule 10308 is unnecessary.
In addition, this provision of amended NASD Rule 10308 would prohibit
the Director of Arbitration from appointing as chairperson all PIABA
members and expert witnesses who primarily represent investors in
adversarial proceedings concerning disputed securities or commodities
transactions, unless all public arbitrators appointed to the panel primarily
represented investors in such matters.
7. Arbitrator Disqualification and Removal
An arbitrator may be disqualified under amended NASD Rule 10308 if
a party or the Director of Arbitration objects to continued service after the
arbitrator has been appointed to serve on a panel but before the initial
prehearing or hearing, whichever occurs first. 240 During this period, the
Director of Arbitration has the sole authority to decide whether an
arbitrator may be disqualified. This is virtually the same authority given to
the Director of Arbitration under prior NASD Rule 10308.241 The AAA
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998).'
239 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute
Arbitration Clauses, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26,805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144,
21,145-46 (1989).
240 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(d)(1) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. 40,772 at 40,763.
241 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10312(d) (National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1997) (amended 1998); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
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also gives its staff this authority but only if a party objects to the continued
service of an arbitrator. However, the parties can override the Director of
Arbitration's decision to disqualify an arbitrator if they unanimously agree,
in writing, that the arbitrator should be allowed to serve. 242 The authority
of the Director of Arbitration to remove an arbitrator from the panel ends
after the commencement of the first prehearing conference or the first
hearing, whichever occurs first. 243
Vacancies resulting from disqualification are filled by referring to the
consolidated lists from which the panel was originally appointed and
selecting the most highly ranked available arbitrator. 244 If no names remain
on the consolidated list, the Director of Arbitration may only appoint a
public arbitrator from the NASD arbitrator pool, unless the parties agree to
a different panel composition. 245 As previously discussed, at this stage of
the proceedings, the Director of Arbitration's unilateral decision may be
overturned only if parties unanimously agree, in writing, within fifteen
days after being notified of the Director of Arbitration's decision. 246
Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
242 See NASD CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(d)(1) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
243 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(d)(2) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
2 4 4 See NASD CODE OF AREBIRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(d)(3) (National
Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public
Customers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,672 (1998).
245 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rules 10308(c)(4)(B), (d)(3)
(National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Order Granting Approval to
Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving
Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 56,671-72.
246 See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(d)(1) (National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999); see also Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63
Fed. Reg. at 40,763.
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C. Unfettered Securities Industry Discretion
The Director of Arbitration is given explicit authority to exercise her
discretion in the arbitrator selection process under paragraph (e) of
amended NASD Rule 10308. Although not expressly stated in the text of
paragraph (e) of amended NASD Rule 10308, its Commentary provides
that the Director of Arbitration may exercise this discretionary authority
only if circumstances arise in which amended NASD Rule 10308 "does not
have an applicable provision' or "the application of a specific provision" of
amended NASD Rule 10308 would not resolve an "underlying problem"
because of "unanticipated or unusual" circumstances. 247 This type of
blanket authority in the arbitrator selection process does not exist, and is
not considered necessary, in the AAA Code. Moreover, the text of
amended NASD Rule 10308 seems to go further in that it authorizes the
Director of Arbitration to "make any decision that is consistent with [the
NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure] to facilitate the appointment of
arbitration panels and the resolution of arbitration disputes., 248 Paragraph
(e) reasonably may be perceived as undermining the NASD's goal of
alleviating investor perception that the NASD arbitrator selection process is
biased in favor of the securities industry because it gives such blanket
authority to the securities industry in the NASD arbitral forum.
V. INVESTOR PERCEPTION OF A PRO-SECURITIES INDUSTRY'BIAS
Amended NASD Rule 10308 is ineffective in lessening investor
perception that the NASD's arbitrator selection process is biased in favor of
the securities industry. There is likely to remain an appearance of
impropriety in the arbitrator selection process because of ambiguity, under-
inclusiveness, and over-inclusiveness in the arbitrator classification system
combined with too much securities industry discretion in the appointment
process of a securities industry sponsored and administered arbitral forum.
The arbitrator classification system under amended NASD Rule 10308
fails to address satisfactorily investor perception that the NASD arbitrator
selection process is biased in, favor of the securities industry. This
perception persists because the arbitrator classification rules in amended
247 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,773.
248 NASD CODE oF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 10308(e) (National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc. 1999) (emphasis added).
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NASD Rule 10308 easily result in misclassification of arbitrators in the
NASD arbitrator pool. Arbitrator classification rules under amended NASD
Rule 10308 are based on arbitrary assumptions causing its classification
scheme to be under-inclusive, over-inclusive, ambiguous, and very difficult
to enforce. For example, arbitrary time designations are used to determine
whether an individual is likely to be perceived as biased in favor of the
securities industry and therefore should be classified as a securities industry
arbitrator. This results in the same person being classified as a securities
industry arbitrator one year and as a public arbitrator the next year,
regardless of actual bias. Amended NASD Rule 10308 assumes that those
formerly associated with the securities industry cease to be biased in favor
of the securities industry exactly three years after being so associated,
unless such individuals retire from the securities industry; professionals
such as attorneys and accountants cease to be biased in favor of the
securities industry two years after devoting more than twenty percent of
their work effort to securities clients. However, bank or financial institution
employees who effect securities transactions, and their supervisors, cease to
be biased in favor of the securities industry the moment they cease to be
employed in the securities industry, i.e., in an instant. The use of such
arbitrary time designations to determine the existence of pro-securities
industry bias does not effectively alleviate investor concern that the NASD
public arbitrator pool includes individuals affiliated with the securities
industry.
Amended NASD Rule 10308 is ambiguous because it fails to define key
terms and phrases used in the NASD's arbitrator classification system. For
example, amended NASD Rule 10308 fails to define clearly the phrase
"person who is otherwise qualified to serve as an arbitrator" as used in its
definitions of public and securities industry arbitrators. This phrase in the
definition of securities industry arbitrator seems to require securities
industry experience, at least three years, to qualify to serve as a securities
industry arbitrator in the NASD arbitrator pool. More importantly, it seems
that public arbitrators are only "qualified to serve" if somehow formerly
affiliated with the securities industry but sufficiently removed from the
securities industry to cease being biased in favor of the securities industry-
three years after terminating employment in the securities industry, if a
person did not retire from the securities industry. This makes individuals
classified as public arbitrators in the NASD arbitrator pool even more
suspect. Moreover, use of this phrase seems to confirm the perception of
investors that the NASD public arbitrator pool includes arbitrators affiliated
with the securities industry.
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The arbitrator classification system under amended NASD Rule 10308
continues to permit the firms of professionals to represent the securities
industry with impunity, while classifying the individual professional at the
firm as a public arbitrator in the NASD arbitrator pool. Amended NASD
Rule 10308 completely ignores the fact that economic ties between partners
reasonably may give rise to an appearance of bias in favor of the securities
industry in its public arbitrator pool; curiously, this fact is recognized in the
context of spouses and immediate family members of those employed in the
securities industry. In addition, amended NASD Rule 10308 persists in
erroneously classifying investment advisers as public arbitrators, even
though they are clearly an integral part of the securities industry.
Finally and most importantly, amended NASD Rule 10308 points out
the difficulty, maybe the impossibility, of eliminating the perception of pro-
securities industry bias in the NASD arbitrator pool when an economically
dependent relationship exists between one of the parties (securities industry
respondents) and the arbitrators deciding the dispute. This is especially so
in light of the fact that the securities industry also drafts the agreement
requiring investors to arbitrate future disputes in a securities industry
sponsored and administered forum, e.g., the NASD arbitral forum.
Specifically, the NASD has acknowledged in its arbitrator selection rules
and its related Commentary that immediate family members who have an
economically dependent relationship with a member of the securities
industry are precluded from serving as either securities industry or public
arbitrators because they "may be viewed as possessing a bias in favor of the
securities or commodities industry." 249 It is clear that the NASD arbitrator
selection process is administered by an arbitral forum that is economically
dependent on the securities industry; the NASD arbitral forum is primarily
funded by a securities industry association (the NASD) which is supported
by the payment of dues from its members-securities industry firms. In
addition, the NASD remains the sole arbiter of who is admitted in its
arbitrator pool and whether they are classified as public or securities
industry arbitrators. Standards governing admittance to the NASD
arbitrator pool remain a mystery. Moreover, the fact that the NASD
controls admission and classification of individuals in its arbitrator pool
may result in its arbitrator selection process being perceived as biased in
favor of the securities industry no matter how its classification rules are
crafted. Accordingly, investors' perceptions that the arbitrator selection
process is biased in favor of the securities industry is quite reasonable, if
249 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,767.
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not inevitable.
The arbitrator appointment process in amended NASD Rule 10308 does
not permit arbitrators to be chosen primarily by the parties rather than by
the securities industry. Too much securities industry discretion remains in
the arbitrator appointment process. Although a software program, NLSS, is
used to choose the names of arbitrators from the NASD arbitrator pool,
NASD staff discretion is interposed before lists of arbitrators are forwarded
to the parties for ranking. NASD staff perform a manual review for
conflicts of interest after arbitrators have been selected from the NASD
pool of arbitrators using NLSS but before these lists of arbitrators are
forwarded to the parties for ranking. This means that NASD staff may
remove an arbitrator, selected on a rotational basis, from a list before the
list is sent to the parties for ranking. But the purpose of generating lists
using NLSS on a rotational basis is to remove NASD staff, and therefore
securities industry discretion, from the arbitrator appointment process at an
early stage of the proceedings, i.e., "to divest the NASD of its power to
select arbitrators on a case-by-case basis." 250 Allowing NASD staff to
remove arbitrators on the list in their sole discretion undermines this
process and simply fuels the perception by investors that the arbitrator
selection process is biased in favor of the securities industry.
The NASD states that this review is necessary because NLSS is limited
in the types of conflicts of interests that it can identify. However, amended
NASD Rule 10308 fails to disclose fully the types of conflicts of interests
that NLSS is capable of identifying. The Commentary only identifies two
such conflicts of interest. 251 In addition, neither amended NASD Rule
10308 nor its Commentary disclose how arbitrators currently in the NASD
arbitrator pool, or added subsequently, would be initially positioned in the
NLSS database. Without such disclosure, investors reasonably may
perceive that manipulation of the arbitrator pool results in an arbitrator
selection process that is biased in favor of the securities industry.
Amended NASD Rule 10308 also allows securities industry discretion
in the arbitrator ranking process. As a result, the outcome is not determined
primarily by the parties. If a party fails to rank or assigns the same
numerical ranking to an arbitrator on a list, the Director of Arbitration
ranks such arbitrators on behalf of a party. Moreover, the Director of
Arbitration is required to assume that the parties intended to rank such
arbitrators. For example, if a party fails to rank two or more arbitrators on
250 Bernstein, supra note 152, at 17.
251 See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 40,761.
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the same list or gives two or more arbitrators on the same list the same
numerical ranking, the Director of Arbitration ranks the multiple, unranked
arbitrators and the arbitrators with the same numerical ranking in the same
order of preference in which they appeared on the original list sent to the
parties generated by NLSS and manually reviewed by NASD staff. This
procedure requires the Director of Arbitration to assume that the parties
would have ranked the arbitrators in a certain manner. This particular
procedure allows securities industry discretion in the ranking process of the
parties because it substitutes NASD staff judgment for the judgment of the
parties.
The decisions of the parties in the appointment process can again be
circumvented by the securities industry when arbitrators on the lists ranked
by the parties are contacted to determine whether they are available to serve
on a panel. When contacting arbitrators on the lists, only the Director of
Arbitration determines whether to disqualify the arbitrator based on
information obtained during this initial contact. This means that the parties'
choices, and thus their participation, may be diminished greatly at this stage
of the arbitrator selection process. Arbitrators ranked highest by the parties
may not be appointed to serve on the panel, despite their availability.
Disclosing such information to the parties for a determination as to whether
the disclosed relationship or interest rises to the level that it would preclude
the arbitrator from rendering an impartial decision probably would be more
appropriate.
If the list selection process fails to complete a panel, arbitrators are
selected by NASD staff rather than by the parties. Amended NASD Rule
10308 allows the Director of Arbitration to appoint arbitrators not on a
consolidated list if the number of arbitrators available to serve from a
consolidated list is insufficient to complete a panel. If the parties strike all
the names on the list, the Director of Arbitration essentially determines
which arbitrators will serve on the panel; parties may request only that the
arbitrator selected by the Director of Arbitration be disqualified. But
permitting the parties only to request the disqualification of an arbitrator
appointed in the sole discretion of the Director of Arbitration does not
facilitate the selection of arbitrators primarily by the parties. This
procedure only fuels investor perception that the NASD arbitrator selection
process is biased in favor of the securities industry.
Despite NASD protestations that amended NASD Rule 10308 permits
selection of arbitrators primarily by the parties rather than the securities
industry, the NASD seemingly attempts to undermine the participation of
parties who are investors when appointing the chairperson of arbitrator
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panels. If the parties cannot agree on whom to appoint as chairperson
within fifteen days of being notified of the names of arbitrators appointed to
the panel, the Director of Arbitration appoints a public arbitrator as
chairperson. However, amended NASD Rule 10308 prohibits the Director
of Arbitration from appointing as chairperson a public arbitrator who
devotes fifty percent or more of her work effort, within the last two years,
to investors involved in disputes with the securities industry. This rule
assumes that any person representing investors fifty percent or more of her
time is biased in favor of investors to the extent that it would not be "fair"
to securities industry respondents to allow such a person to serve as
chairperson. This assumption is unfounded. The securities industry controls
the pool from which arbitrators are selected to serve on the panel, and it
has control at the very beginning of the arbitrator selection process by
limiting the universe of choices by the parties. Moreover, there are
numerous opportunities, as previously discussed, for the exercise of NASD
staff discretion throughout the arbitrator appointment process. This
particular section of amended NASD Rule 10308 will, probably more than
any other, fuel the perception of investors that the arbitrator selection
process, including the entire securities industry sponsored arbitration
process, is dominated, controlled, and biased in favor of the securities
industry.
Finally, subsection (e) of amended NASD Rule 10308 appears to give
the industry unfettered discretion, not only in the arbitrator selection
process, but also in the entire NASD arbitration process. Accordingly, it
may be perceived by investors as undermining party participation in the
arbitrator selection process enumerated elsewhere in amended NASD Rule
10308. It is essential that the selection of the decisionmaker, i.e., the
arbitrator, in securities industry sponsored arbitration proceedings be
perceived as fair and impartial. Even the perception by investors that the
securities industry dominates the arbitrator selection process can destroy the
credibility of the NASD arbitral forum.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the list selection method of appointing arbitrators in amended
NASD Rule 10308 is a significant step in reducing NASD staff discretion
in the arbitrator selection process, it will never be enough to eliminate
investor perception that NASD arbitrators are biased in favor of the
securities industry. In situations where there are questions about the
impartiality of a decisionmaker, enhancing procedures to select arbitrators
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
ARBITRATOR SELECTION AT THE NASD
will never be sufficient to assure participants that the arbitrators are
independent. 252 The selection of arbitrators in the NASD arbitral forum is
just such a situation. Even though investors now participate by using a list
selection method, the arbitrator selection process remains subject to NASD
staff, and therefore securities industry, discretion because it is administered
by the NASD, a securities industry member association funded by the dues
of its membership. 253 Moreover, the securities industry controls the group
and classification of individuals allowed to serve as NASD arbitrators. This
means that the securities industry determines who is admitted to the
available arbitrator pool and whether arbitrators in its arbitrator pool are
classified as public or securities industry arbitrators. Investors only
participate in the arbitrator selection process after the securities industry
has determined, in rules it promulgates, 254 who gets to be an arbitrator and
whether an arbitrator is classified as public or securities industry.
The equitable selection of arbitrators is essential to the success of the
NASD arbitral forum. As presently constituted, there is a valid perception
that NASD arbitrators are not impartial or independent of the securities
industry. Moreover, investors do not have an equal right to control the
appointment of the arbitral panel; currently, NASD staff plays a
disproportionate role in selecting arbitrators in the NASD arbitral forum.
Accordingly, the NASD arbitrator selection process is reasonably perceived
by investors as, at least, institutionally linked to the securities industry.
Moreover, investors do not have a choice in selecting a more acceptable
arbitrator selection process or arbitral forum. Generally, they are required
by a contract drafted by the securities industry, which they must sign in
order to do business with the securities industry, to use only a securities
industry forum; in most cases, this is the NASD arbitral forum. 255
The selection of arbitrators in securities arbitration should be done by a
truly independent group. The author recommends that, at least, the
selection of arbitrators should be administered by the AAA. This is not a
novel idea. Even the Commission has suggested to the securities industry
252 See Allison, supra note 70, at 482.
253 The formation of an "independent," wholly-owned subsidiary to administer the
NASD arbitral forum does not negate the fact that the NASD arbitral forum is
sponsored, funded, and administered by the securities industry.
2 5 4 The author recognizes that rules promulgated by the NASD are subject to
Commission review and approval.
255 The author recognizes that some contracts allow investors to use the so-called
"AMEX Window" which allows investors to arbitrate disputes with the securities
industry using the AAA arbitral forum.
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that investors should be given the option of arbitrating disputes with
members of the securities industry in the AAA arbitral forum. As
previously noted, even though the AAA rules governing the selection of
arbitrators are similar and, in many ways, just as ambiguous as the NASD
rules, investors perceive the AAA arbitral forum to be independent and not
biased in favor of the securities industry. Allowing investors to have the
AAA option, at least for the selection of arbitrators, "deflects the
contention that the public is being forced into an industry sponsored SRO
forum, and thus enhances the image of fairness of the arbitration
process." 256 Moreover, fairness dictates that investors should have at least
persons designated as public arbitrators who are truly independent of the
securities industry.
The author contends that the implementation of a list selection method
for selecting arbitrators' addresses is at best only half of the problem
because the NASD continues to control who is admitted to the pool of
arbitrators; the arbitrators placed on lists under the new list selection
method can be selected only from the NASD-controlled pool of arbitrators.
Moreover, if a complete panel cannot be appointed from the lists submitted
to the parties, the NASD again appoints arbitrators to the list in its sole
discretion. It is strongly recommended that the selection of arbitrators in
investor disputes be removed from the NASD arbitral forum and
transferred to an independent arbitral forum such as the AAA. Investors'
confidence in securities arbitration depends on at least the perception of the
fairness and impartiality of the arbitrators deciding their disputes. Investors
most likely will always perceive NASD arbitrators to be biased until the
arbitrator selection method is perceived as fair in fact and appearance.
"[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done. 257 Until this is achieved, the NASD will continue to
strive for an elusive goal, i.e., proving to investors that its securities
industry controlled arbitrator selection process results in arbitration
proceedings that are "fair to all parties."
256 Katsoris, supra note 3, at 525.
257 Katsoris, supra note 2, at 310 (quoting Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting The King
v. Sussex Justices, 1 K. B. 256, 259 (1924))).
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